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Investor ambiguity, systemic banking risk and economic activity: 
The case of too-big-to-fail 
 
Tarik Driouchi, Raymond HY So and Lenos Trigeorgis 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between investors’ ambiguity in the financial options market and 
systemic banks’ risk. Eliciting ambiguity information from option pricing data on the twelve major U.S. banks 
between 2003 and 2010, we show that higher behavioral deviations from risk-neutral and Bayesian valuation (i.e., 
investor ambiguity) are associated with higher systemic banks’ downside, market and credit risks. Consistent with 
behavioral explanations, we confirm the detrimental effect of ambiguity on financial market outcomes and find strong 
evidence of ambiguity among call and put option holders. Variance decomposition indicates that such a pattern of 
behavior explains a significant proportion of U.S. banking risk variance. This effect is more pronounced during 
periods of economic turbulence and bank stress (i.e., the 2007-2009 crisis), and holds after controlling for size, tail 
risk, implied volatility, and volatility of volatility dynamics. We also document that ambiguity from the financial 
market has a depressing impact on real economic activity, including capacity utilization, non-farm payrolls and 
overall economic performance. Our findings are robust to alternative specifications of ambiguity such as multiple 
priors and expected utilities with uncertain probabilities.  
 
Key words: behavioral theory, ambiguity, derivatives, too-big-to-fail, systemic risk 
 
1. Introduction  
Rarely has the classical distinction between risk and uncertainty (e.g., Knight, 1921; Keynes, 1921) been so evident 
in the financial markets than in the years surrounding the most recent global financial crisis. The banking crisis of 
2007-2008 and its aftermath exposed the fragility of standard frameworks used to monitor risk and instability in the 
financial system (Poon, 2009; Stiglitz, 2011; Brown and Hao, 2012). These developments have turned global stock 
exchanges into occasional silos of fear and ambiguity. As a result, a number of authors and policy makers have called 
for stricter market regulation and closer scrutiny of investment behavior during economic cycles (Vinogradov, 2012; 
Wegener et al., 2019; Cumming et al., 2018).  
While various studies in mainstream finance and economics have attempted to provide behavioral 
explanations to specific market phenomena especially in the context of financial crises or highly uncertain events 
(Low, 2004; Poteshman, 2006), fewer empirical papers have explicitly analyzed the presence or impact of ambiguity 
- as uncertainty beyond risk - in financial decision-making and financial markets (e.g., Shu, 2010; Boyarchenko, 
2012; Driouchi et al., 2018). In organizations research, however, and due to fundamental insights from behavioral 
decision theory (Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1978; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985), notions of ambiguity and 
Knightian uncertainty have been investigated relatively extensively in several empirical contexts (individuals and 
corporate). These include leadership and management quality (Jacquart and Antonakis, 2015), entrepreneurship and 
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venture capital (Sommer et al., 2009; Petkova et al., 2014; Artinger and Powell, 2016), acquisition integration 
(Cording et al., 2008), research and development (Carson et al., 2006), individual assessment (Dunning et al., 1989), 
cash management and derivatives use (Friberg and Seiler, 2017), and financial reporting and IPO listing (Arnold et 
al., 2010; Park and Patel, 2015). Park and Patel (2015), in particular, document a positive relationship between 
ambiguity inferred from the IPO prospectuses of newly listed U.S. firms and their IPO underpricing, confirming that 
ambiguity matters to prospective investors. Similar conclusions are reached by Arnold et al. (2010) who link 
ambiguity information to IPO excess returns. Friberg and Seiler (2017) show that higher ambiguity (risk), inferred 
from 10-Ks, is associated with higher cash holdings (derivatives use). Despite this recent evidence, no study we know 
of has empirically examined how or whether investor ambiguity affects the performance of banks, the financial 
system and real economic activity. We contribute to the literature by unveiling the role of investors’ ambiguity 
(inferred from systemic banks’ financial option pricing data, and for robustness, from the iShares US financials ETF 
(IYF)) in the financial system and the real economy. We add to extant research by examining the case of too-big-to-
fail banks and investigating linkages between investor subjective behavior, derivatives markets, systemic risk and 
real economic outcomes. 
This is important given contemporary rhetoric on the role of banks and derivatives instruments in recent 
financial crises (Boyarchenko, 2012; Bruce and Skovoroda, 2013; Ivanov et al., 2016; Bushman et al., 2018), and 
growing evidence on the antecedents and implications of deviating behavior and cognition in financial services (e.g., 
Vaaler and McNamara, 2004; Easley and O’Hara, 2009; Bilinski et al., 2019). The case of U.S. systemic banks and 
their exposure to uncertainty during the 2003-2009 period indeed provides a unique natural setting for testing 
ambiguity theory predictions in practice. We address the following questions: does investors’ ambiguity behavior in 
the financial options market contribute to systemic banking risk? Is this effect more pronounced during banking 
crises and what are the implications for the real economy? Specifically, we investigate whether and the extent to 
which investors’ ambiguity in the banking options market is associated with systemic banks’ risk and banking 
instability in the equity and credit markets, and - subsequently - the real economy.  
Drawing from behavioral theory, our paper primarily studies the ambiguity of investors holding call and put 
options on U.S. systemic bank stocks over the seven-year period 2003-2009. We define ambiguity as uncertainty 
beyond probabilistic risk, namely: investors’ subjective deviations from risk-neutral valuation and Bayesian behavior 
(see Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Baillon and L’Haridon, 2016). We study ambiguity under Choquet utility (CU), α-
multiple priors (α-MEP) and the expected utility with uncertain probabilities (EUUP) (Chateauneuf et al., 2001; 
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Ghirardato et al., 2004; Izhakian and Yermack, 2017). We posit that banking investors’ ambiguity in the option 
market results in errors in judgment, subjective valuation, suboptimal exercise decisions, ineffective hedging and 
poor trading performance in the marketplace (see e.g., Easley and O’Hara, 2010; Leiblein et al., 2017 on the role of 
subjective uncertainty and cognition in financial trading and resource allocation processes), increasing risk and 
instability in the financial system. We view ambiguity in our context as the subjective deviations from risk-neutrality 
(Bayesian behavior) caused by uncertainty in model specification and in the number of distributions characterizing 
cognitive valuation processes (e.g., see Mosakowski, 1997; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986). Thus, we examine the 
relationship between investors’ ambiguity and systemic banks’ overall market performance. The first part of our 
sample covers a period of relative economic stability and growth (2003-2006), while the latter part (2007-2009) 
covers the 2007-2008 credit crunch, the 2008 global financial markets crash and the subsequent economic recession. 
For robustness, we also test the role of ambiguity in systemic banking performance over the longer period 1999-2015 
after extracting EUUP-based ambiguity information from S&P500 index (SPX) returns data. 
We rely on the CU and α-MEP specifications in our ambiguity elicitation because of the probabilistic and 
lottery-like features of financial options instruments (i.e., asymmetric payoffs and bets on volatility), and the 
sophisticated nature of options investors. We find that ambiguity from banking equity option prices has a significant 
positive effect on systemic banks’ downside risk, as well as credit and market risks. Ambiguity among put option 
holders has a positive effect on systemic banking risk. For call option traders, higher ambiguity is associated with 
higher banking risk. In sum, ambiguity from systemic banks’ options prices exacerbates the levels of risk and 
instability present in the banking system, especially in times of heightened uncertainty. This holds after controlling 
for important option-based and market determinants of banking risk, such as liquidity, size, fat tail risk, implied 
volatility, and volatility of volatility. Our results are robust to different option-moneyness levels, alternative 
ambiguity measures (including EUUP-based ones from IYF and SPX), and under various data/model specifications 
(i.e., using daily or monthly price and volatility data). They also hold using panel regressions that relate ambiguity 
to “too-big-to-fail” bank-specific risk (after controlling for standard characteristics). We further show that the elicited 
ambiguity information (AMB) from option prices and IYF data is significantly negatively associated with important 
aspects of real economic activity, including capacity utilization (production), total non-farm payrolls (net hiring) and 
overall economic output (proxied by the CFNAI). This finding concurs with recent evidence by Berger et al. (2017) 
and Jin et al. (2019) on the effects of economic policy uncertainty on liquidity creation and earnings management. 
We provide an ambiguity-based behavioral explanation to the uncertainty-performance linkage. An alternative and 
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related explanation to this association is the potential role played by disagreement (sentiment risk) in exacerbating 
systemic risk (see e.g, Basak, 2000; Yan, 2008; Baker et al., 2016).1 Recent research indicates that differences of 
opinion and disagreement affect asset prices, default propensities and liquidity, and also explain a number of 
international finance anomalies (Osambela, 2015; Dumas et al., 2017). 
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we establish a linkage between option investors' 
(subjective) behavior in the marketplace and U.S. systemic banks performance. Specifically, we provide evidence of 
ambiguity in financial market transactions involving the twelve too-big-to-fail banks and show how option holders’ 
ambiguity behavior exacerbates the amount of risk present in the financial system. Second, we confirm the adverse 
effect of uncertainty on economic activity by documenting how ambiguity from systemic banks’ equity options brings 
losses to the real economy. Our study is the first to empirically link investor behavior and ambiguity to systemic 
banks’ risk in a natural market setting. It also indirectly relates to extant business and management research on the 
relationship between ambiguity and firm or industry performance (e.g., Mosakowski, 1997; King and Zeithaml, 2001; 
Petkova et al., 2014; Friberg and Seiler, 2017).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theory and hypotheses, and 
describes the behavioral frameworks we use to elicit ambiguity from systemic banks’ option prices (and IYF as well 
as SPX intraday returns). Section 3 covers our data and empirical methods. Section 4 discusses findings and resulting 
implications. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Over the years, Knight (1921), Keynes (1921), and many others (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961; March, 1978; Quiggin, 
1982) have recognized that while risk is characterized by events with measurable probability outcomes, under 
uncertain conditions such probabilities may not be fully knowable and decision-makers are more doubtful or 
ambiguous about the accuracy of their probability estimates. Such behavior results in subjective discounting, non-
additive probability weighting and subjective valuation when choices are made under uncertainty (Hogarth and 
Kunreuther, 1989; Samuelson, 2008). We interpret ambiguity in this paper as investors’ propensity to deviate from 
                                                          
1 While the focus of this research is on the role of ambiguity in systemic banking performance, further analysis (using monthly 
multivariate/orthogonalized regressions) indicates that both ambiguity and sentiment increase systemic banking risk suggesting 
potential interactions between the two concepts (especially under α-MEP where pessimism and optimism information overlaps 
with disagreement). The sentiment indicator used in this analysis is a composite score of several disagreement and sentiment 
proxies including: Investor Sentiment Index Aligned (AISI, Huang et al., 2014), Consumer Confidence Index (CCI), Investors 
Intelligence Bearish Index (IBEAR, Fisher and Statman, 2000), Investor Sentiment Index (ISI, Baker and Wurgler, 2006), and 
the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (UMCSI). 
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Bayesian valuation because of a lack of complete information regarding the future realizations of market 
returns/volatility and investors’ inability to rule out the number of distributions associated with their valuation 
heuristics and estimates (see the related Brownian motions in Eqs. (A3-A4) in Appendix A). This interpretation is 
closely related to that - from applied psychology - of Mosakowski (1997) and Einhorn and Hogarth (1985), and is 
also comparable to the lack of information clarity definition by Friberg and Seiler (2017). The aforementioned 
deviations affect the probabilities (i.e., probabilistic ambiguity) and investor uncertainty preferences (i.e., aversion 
or seeking). We, thus, build on notions of non-additive probabilities and decision weights (e.g., Hogarth and Einhorn, 
1990; Abdellaoui et al., 2005; Chateauneuf et al., 2007; Abdellaoui et al., 2011) to elicit ambiguity information from 
financial derivatives transactions. Under CU (α-MEP), ambiguity aversion (pessimism) can be viewed as investors’ 
tendency to overweight events with bad outcomes (relative to objective probabilities) when faced with uncertainty, 
while ambiguity-seeking (optimism) is proxied by investors’ propensity to overweight good, but less probable, 
outcomes displaying gambling or uncertainty-loving comportment (see Schmeidler, 1989; Ghirardato et al., 2004; 
Chateauneuf et al., 2007). The EUUP-based ambiguity information by Brenner and Izhakian (2018), examined herein 
for robustness, captures the degree of probabilistic ambiguity in the marketplace but not necessarily the direction of 
ambiguity. The latter is reflected in our α-MEP ambiguity indicators (e.g., ambiguity pessimism) and is also partly 
proxied by our CU-based ambiguity measures. 
 
2.1. Ambiguity frameworks 
Different from  Leiblein et al. (2017) who use signaling theory to account for subjective biases in Black-Scholes-
Merton (BSM) valuation, we model ambiguity based on the Choquet utility (CU): a rank-dependent specification 
nested within cumulative prospect theory (see Schmeidler, 1989; Dow and Werlang, 1992; Hey et al., 2010; Driouchi 
et al., 2018), and also using a framework related to CU: multiple priors MEP (in particular α-MEP) which has been 
examined more broadly in finance and portfolio selection research (see e.g., Uppal and Wang, 2003; Maenhout, 
2004). The α-MEP ambiguity specification goes beyond the assumption of extreme pessimism or complete aversion 
to uncertainty of the standard MEP in that, through the use of decision weights, it accommodates both optimistic and 
pessimistic appraisals. Overall, we relax the assumption of uncertainty-neutrality (i.e., which consists of assigning 
equal weights to positive and negative prospects) characterizing the standard BSM framework by explicitly 
incorporating ambiguity in the stochastic process driving stock and option prices, thus allowing the possibility of 
multiple distributions for valuation (see Appendix A contrasting ambiguity-free A1 versus ambiguity-contaminated 
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A3 (CU) and A4 (MEP)). In these broader settings, option investors’ expectations of future underlying stock prices 
depend on their degree of ambiguity and the implicit decision weights assigned to positive vs. negative realizations. 
As such, exercise probabilities are adjusted upward or downward (i.e., in a non-additive probabilistic sense: see 
Appendix B) subject to ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989). Option 
investors/traders are, consequently, more prone to biases and errors in valuation, trading execution and decision-
making because of such adjustments.  
 
2.1.1. Choquet ambiguity 
Extending the Black-Scholes (1973) fundamental valuation equation (e.g., see also Boyarchenko and Levendorskii, 
2007; Driouchi et al., 2018) to the case of Choquet ambiguity based on Eq. (A3), we obtain the following specification 
for ambiguity-adjusted option price O with underlying asset S: 








(𝑠𝜎)2 + (𝑟′ − 𝛿′)
𝜕𝑂
𝜕𝑆
𝑆 − 𝑟′𝑂 = 0                                                     (1) 
 
where: 
𝑟′ = 𝑟 +𝑚
[𝑟 − (𝜇 +𝑚𝜎)]
𝑠2𝜎
 and 𝛿′ = 𝛿 −




𝑚 = 2𝑐 − 1 and 𝑠 = √4𝑐(1 − 𝑐) 
Ambiguity score and capacity variable c captures investors’ ambiguity, with 0 < c < 0.5 interpreted in the CU 
literature as ambiguity aversion, pessimism (negative m) and under- (over-) weighting of good (bad) outcome 
probabilities, 0.5 < c < 1 implying ambiguity-seeking, optimism (positive m) and over- (under-) weighting of good 
(bad) outcome probabilities (see Chateauneuf et al., 2001; Kast and Lapied, 2010; Agliardi, 2017), and equal weight 
c = 0.5 (similar weighting) corresponding to the traditional ambiguity-neutral and Bayesian framework (see e.g., Kast 
and Lapied, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Agliardi et al., 2016; and Driouchi et al., 2018). Score c affects the discount 
rate, dividend yield and volatility used in the behavioral valuation. Under MEP, ambiguity affects the discount rate 
and dividend yield only. Reflecting investors’ degree of ambiguity perceptions over time, ambiguity proxy c does 
not fully delineate ambiguity attitudes from the overall degree of probabilistic ambiguity (Baillon et al. 2017; Baillon 
and L’Haridon, 2016). It is indicative of direction but also contains confounding information about ambiguity 
perceptions. This is due to the use of one score, rather than two, to describe the ambiguity behavior characterizing 
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Eq. (A3). An interesting extension could consist of separating our c indicator into an uncertainty score of likelihood 
insensitivity and a pure index of ambiguity aversion or pessimism (e.g., see Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Baillon et al., 
2017), and study the economic implications of each component using source functions. For further validation of our 
findings (and to remedy the above CU limitation),2 we use the α-MEP specification which captures both pessimism 
and optimism under ambiguity, and the EUUP-based probabilistic ambiguity proxy by Brenner and Izhakian (2018). 
Our CU specification is in accord with the descriptive model of Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) and Hogarth 
and Einhorn (1990) on judgment under ambiguity with behavioral adjustments and non-additive probabilities. In 
such a setting m and s are subjective adjustments factors, caused by ambiguity score c, affecting the valuation process 
and its inputs and inducing potential biases in option exercise, termination and trading execution. m captures 
investors’ pessimism (m < 0 and c < 0.5) or optimism (m > 0 and c > 0.5) about expected growth rates (returns) while 
s is a subjective volatility scaling factor. These two input variables can take a number of functional forms, with the 
special ambiguity-neutral case satisfying m = 0 and s =1 (i.e., more accurate or normative case c = 0.5, see e.g., 
Kuhnen and Melzer, 2018). In the MEP setting, ambiguity affects only the drift of the Brownian motion and not the 
diffusion component (see Eq. (A4)). r, μ, σ and δ stand for the risk-free interest rate, rate of return on S, stock volatility 
and the objective dividend yield, respectively. Each of these four factors is adjusted to account for ambiguity, through 
m and s under CU (and m only in the MEP specification with objective volatility), as shown in Eqs. (1-3). Via their 
second components, r’ and δ’ proxy for investors’ tendency to deviate from risk-neutrality under uncertainty. r’ is 
analogous to a subjective discount rate (e.g., for cases where r > μ+mσ, r’ < r when c < 0.5 and r’ > r when c > 0.5) 
whereas  𝛿′ is an ambiguity multiplier or subjective dividend yield. In the absence of ambiguity (m = 0 and s = 1), 
the above reduces to the ambiguity-neutral and canonical BSM case (where r’ = r and δ’ = δ) resulting in Eqs. (A2) 
and (A2.1). The MEP ambiguity specification can be viewed as a special case of CU under a number of conditions.  
Analogous to Merton (1973), but explicitly accounting for Choquet ambiguity, solutions to Eq. (1) for a 
European call option Ocall with exercise price X and maturity T are: 
                                                           𝑂𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝐶𝑈 = 𝑆0𝑒
−𝛿′𝑇𝑁(𝑑′1)−𝑋𝑒
−𝑟′𝑇𝑁(𝑑′2)   (∀ 𝑐 ∈]0, 1[)                                             (2) 
where:  
                                                          
2 In additional analysis that consists of regressing our CU-based measures of ambiguity on α-MEP counterparts and using the 
residual-based ambiguity proxy as an indirect way to disentangle probabilistic ambiguity from ambiguity attitudes in Eq. (19), 












 and 𝑑′2 = 𝑑′1 − 𝑠𝜎√𝑇 
The above differs from the ambiguity-free BSM Eq. (A2.1), in that we use ambiguity-adjusted factors δ’ and r’ 
(instead of r and δ) and subjective probabilities N(d’) in the valuation (see Eqs. (1-3)).3 Option exercise probabilities 
here are directly affected by Choquet ambiguity through r’, δ’, m and s, due to ambiguity score c, causing behavioral 
deviations from Bayesian appraisal and resulting in over-execution (type 1 errors: exercise of out-of-the money 
(OTM) options) and under-execution (type 2 errors: early or suboptimal exercise/termination of in-the-money (ITM) 
options)) problems (see e.g., Coff and Laverty, 2007; Leiblein et al., 2017).4  
Similarly, solutions to Eq. (1) under Choquet ambiguity for a European put option Oput (i.e., giving the set of 
possible put prices under ambiguity) with exercise price X and maturity T are: 
                                         𝑂𝑝𝑢𝑡
𝐶𝑈 = 𝑋𝑒−𝑟
′𝑇𝑁(−𝑑′2)−𝑆0𝑒
−𝛿′𝑇𝑁(−𝑑′1)   (∀ 𝑐 ∈]0, 1[)                                                 (3) 
r’ and δ’ are as defined above. N(.) is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. N(-d’1) and N(-d’2) are 
once again ambiguity-based option exercise probabilities indicative of uncertainty in valuation and trading behavior. 
Contrary to the standard BSM framework where indifference towards uncertainty is assumed (due to hedgeability), 
put-call parity should not be expected to hold in this setting as call and put holders are unlikely to share similar 
ambiguity characteristics. This is further explained by investors’ differential predispositions towards potential gains 
and losses arising from trading calls vs. puts and the subjective nature of the N(d’) functions (unequal decision 
weights and adjustments to the probabilities). The above once again reduces to single discounting and “objective” 
valuation when c = 0.5 (equal decision weights and special case A2.1). 
Eqs. (2-3) are, thus, natural extensions of the Black-Scholes call and put option formulae to the more general 
case of Choquet ambiguity with m and s adjustments. This also holds for MEP (m ≠ 0 and s =1 in Eqs. (2-3)). By 
                                                          
3  Involving non-additive probabilities under ambiguity, Eq. (2) can be rewritten as (see A2.1 for d1 and d2): 
𝑂𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝐶𝑈 = 𝑆0𝑒
(−𝛿𝑇)𝑁(𝑑1) ∙ 𝑤′1 − 𝑋𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2) ∙ 𝑤′2 








































4 For instance under CU, r’< r (r’> r) can lead to option overvaluation (undervaluation) when c < .5 (c > .5) if r > μ+mσ. As 
another illustration of bias, if for example c = .25 (c = .75), σ = .45 and r = µ = .05, the probability to exercise a put option with 
underlying price S0 = 100, strike price X = 100 and maturity T = 2 becomes .49 (.59) compared to risk-neutral probability .56. 
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back-solving Eqs. (2-3) for ambiguity parameter c, given market-observed option prices, one can infer the level of 
ambiguity implied by traded options prices under CU. We name this c variable ambiguity score AMBCU throughout 
the rest of the paper. The elicitation is achieved by a simple minimization of the distances between the observed 
option market prices and above models’ intrinsic values, effectively inverting Eqs. (2-3) as follows (see also 
Abdellaoui et al., 2011 and their experiment-based elicitation):  
                                                 𝐴𝑀𝐵𝐶𝑈 = 𝑂𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙/𝑝𝑢𝑡
−1 (𝑋, 𝑆, 𝑇, 𝑟, 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝜎)                                                                    (4) 
 
2.1.2. Alpha-MaxMin multiple priors ambiguity (alpha-MEP) 
In addition to the above, we model ambiguity using the α-MEP specification (a variant of the standard MEP 
framework) focusing on uncertainty in drift only. The intuition behind this specification is that investors consider 
something akin to a weighted average between their pessimistic (worst/minimum) and optimistic (best/maximum) 
assessments when cognitively appraising option opportunities under ambiguity. Related to CU, the fundamental 
valuation equation under MEP is subsumed by Eq. (1) (special case s =1). As such, the α-MEP-based option price 
can be expressed as follows: 
                 𝑂
𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎−𝑀𝐸𝑃
 = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑃(𝑋, 𝑆, 𝑇, 𝑟, 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑐)𝑐
arg𝑚𝑎𝑥
+ (1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑃(𝑋, 𝑆, 𝑇, 𝑟, 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝜎, 𝑐)𝑐
arg𝑚𝑖𝑛
                  (5)     
Nested in Eqs. (2-3), OMEP is the value of the option under the multiple priors ambiguity specification where 0 < c < 
1 (and m ≠ 0 and s = 1). Oalpha-MEP is the weighted average of the maximum and minimum OMEP values under c. 
Ambiguity attitude or weighting variable α reflects the trade-off between the best and worst option valuation cases 
(with 0  ≤ α ≤ 1). As mentioned, ambiguity does not affect the diffusion component of the Brownian motion (see Eq. 
(A4)) herein. By back-solving Eq. (5) for parameter α, one can infer investor ambiguity from traded options prices 
under α-MEP. We name this α variable ambiguity score AMBalpha-MEP throughout the rest of the paper. For ease of 
interpretation, AMBalpha-MEP will reflect the weight assigned to pessimistic outcomes.   
 
2.1.3. Alternative ambiguity specification  
Expected utility with uncertain probabilities (EUUP) 
For robustness, we also model ambiguity using the EUUP framework of Brenner and Izhakian (2018) and Izhakian 
and Yermack (2017). EUUP-based ambiguity is defined as follows:  
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𝐸[Ф(𝑟0; 𝜇, 𝜎)]𝑉𝑎𝑟[Ф(𝑟0; 𝜇, 𝜎)]
+∑
𝐸[Ф(𝑟𝑖; 𝜇, 𝜎) − Ф(𝑟𝑖−1; 𝜇, 𝜎)]
× 𝑉𝑎𝑟[Ф(𝑟𝑖; 𝜇, 𝜎) − Ф(𝑟𝑖−1; 𝜇, 𝜎)]
𝑘
𝑖=1
+𝐸[1 − Ф(𝑟𝑘; 𝜇, 𝜎)]𝑉𝑎𝑟[Ф(𝑟𝑘; 𝜇, 𝜎)] )




 is a scaling factor, Ф denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution 
and 𝑃(𝑟 ≥ 𝑟𝑓) = 1 − Ф(𝑟𝑓; 𝜇, 𝜎), k is the number of intervals in pooling returns, with a total number of bins of k+2, 
𝜇 is the daily mean of intra-day five-minute returns, and 𝜎 is the realized variance of intra-day five-minute returns. 
Following Brenner and Izhakian (2018), we use a value of -6% for 𝑟0 and k = 60. In our research, we elicit AMB
BI 
scores from IYF (and SPX) using intraday data. 
Since derivatives markets are known to lead primary asset markets in terms of information discovery (lead-
lag association) and, potentially, risk contagion (Poon and Granger, 2003; Kelly et al., 2016), we examine the extent 
to which banking investors’ ambiguity in the option market is associated with the subsequent degree of risk 
characterizing the twelve major systemic banks in the equity and credit markets. For robustness, we also study the 
role of ambiguity from IYF in banking performance. We focus on financial institutions because of the high 
uncertainty surrounding the banking sector over the past decade (Boyarchenko 2012; Kelly et al., 2016; Vallascas et 
al., 2017). Our aim is to examine from a behavioral theory perspective whether, and the extent to which, ambiguity 
variables AMB contribute to systemic banks’ risk and decrease real economic activity. We are concerned with 
downside, systematic (market) and credit risks as key indicators of systemic banks’ performance. 
 
2.2. Hypotheses 
As subjective behavior tends to limit investors’ ability to effectively hedge their trading positions and results in more 
errors and losses in options trading (over- and under-execution) (Poteshman, 2001; Poteshman and Serbin, 2003), 
ambiguity elicited from option prices should be positively associated with downside risk. Due to disagreement, 
suboptimal investment allocation and speculative trades under uncertainty (see e.g., Bargeron et al., 2014; Baker et 
al., 2016; Dicks and Fulghieri, 2019), ambiguity reflected in banks’ equity options should also be positively 
associated with systematic risk. Further, because of induced put-call parity violations (Cremers and Weinbaum, 2010; 
Chen et al., 2019), the inability to fully hedge such violations and the leveraged nature of options (see Borochin and 
Yang, 2017), ambiguity should be positively associated with credit risk. Differences in moneyness expectations and 
misspecification around exercise probabilities should also result in more leveraged and riskier option positions, and 
thus higher systemic risk. This holds for both put and call options instruments. Call and put option-elicited ambiguity 
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should then also explain positive changes in systemic banks’ risk. The above leads to the following hypothesis for 
our 2003-2009 too-big-to-fail banking context: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Ambiguity in the call and put options markets is positively associated with systemic banks’ risk. 
 
Additionally in times of crisis-induced turbulence, ambiguity behavior should be more prevalent in the economic 
environment and financial markets. In such conditions, economic agents, investors/traders and other decision-makers 
are more prone to errors and biases due to Knightian uncertainty, increasing disagreement, lower sophistication and 
highly incomplete information (see Easley and O’Hara, 2010; Leiblein et al., 2017). Ambiguity averse investors can 
be more averse because of limited market participation, higher demand for self-insurance and flight-to-quality 
behavior (Alary et al., 2013; Dicks and Fulghieri, 2019). Ambiguity-seeking investors might be more erratic, 
aggressive and miscalibrated as a result of growing speculation and uncertainty-loving behavior (e.g., shorting calls) 
in the marketplace (see e.g., Cao et al., 2005; Tarashev, 2007). This implies that higher ambiguity should further 
increase risk in the financial system and financial market instability. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between ambiguity and systemic banks’ risk is more prevalent during times 
of high economic uncertainty and crisis-induced turbulence. 
 
3. Data, variables and methods 
3.1. Data 
We study the ambiguity behavior of call and put option investors in major U.S. banks during 2003-2010. Options 
data (dividend-adjusted) on the twelve systemic or too-big-to-fail financial institutions (tickers C, GS, JPM, MS, 
USB, WFC, BS, LEH, BAC, MER, WM, WB)5 are obtained from OptionMetrics over a period of 1700 days. The 
data includes daily settlement prices for the call and put options (Ocall/put), their maturity dates (T), exercise prices (X) 
and open-interest (OI) information. Settlement prices for the underlying bank equities and market capitalization data 
are used to estimate downside risk (DR, downside realized volatility), option-elicited ambiguity indicators (AMBCU 
and AMBalpha-MEP), and option implied volatility (IV). For AMBBI, we follow the approach by Brenner and Izhakian 
(2018) and infer ambiguity information primarily from the iShares Dow Jones US financial sector ETF (IYF). We 
                                                          
5 Namely: Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, US Bancorp, Wells Fargo, Bear Stearns, Lehman Bros, Bank 
of America, Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual, and Wachovia. These twelve systemic banks were at the center of the 2007-
2009 credit crisis and were viewed as the largest security firms and commercial banks in the U.S. (see also Eichler et al., 2011; 
Gande and Kalpathy, 2017).  
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also estimate and use systematic risk (EBETA, historical CAPM-beta) and credit risk (CR, realized volatility of the 
3-month ICE LIBOR rate) as alternative dependent variables in our systemic banking risk analysis.6 Our dependent 
variables (DR, EBETA and CR) are important indicators of overall banking performance from a market standpoint. 
Skewness (SKEW) or tail risk, and volatility of volatility (SDVIX, standard deviation of VIX) are obtained from the 
CBOE through its SKEW and VIX indices. IV, OI, SKEW and SDVIX serve as (daily and monthly) control variables 
from the options market and are established determinants of market risk. In our additional results using panel 
regressions, we also control for bank size. 
We follow standard procedure for option contract selection in terms of maturity matching and data 
specifications (see e.g., Swidler and Wilcox, 2002; Friesen et al. 2012; Bargeron et al., 2014). Spanning the recent 
great recession (2007-2009) and the preceding more stable period (2003-2006), our sample allows comparing and 
contrasting banking investor ambiguity across different uncertainty regimes (higher vs. lower). IVs and AMBs are 
computed, using both daily and monthly data, from settlement prices of the selected option contracts, inferred from 
our ambiguity-based Eqs. (2, 3 and 5). Following Brenner and Izhakian (2018) and their elicitation approach, we 
compute our AMBBI score using the intra-day returns of IYF and SPX for additional robustness. Yields on U.S. T-
bills and T-bonds over the maturity of each contract are used as risk-free rates (r) in computing IVs and AMBs per 
bank, and aggregate indicators of ambiguity (AMBbanking) for the overall sample (see the Explanatory variables sub-
section for our AMBbanking specifications). The annualized average daily returns per bank over the previous year are 
employed to estimate its expected return (μ).7 For the real economy implications covered in Section 4.3, monthly 
economic activity data are obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (on capacity 
utilization), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (non-farm payrolls) and the Chicago Fed website (CFNAI). 
 
3.2. Variables  
3.2.1. Dependent variables  
Downside Risk (DR). DR is estimated as the annualized ex-post sample standard deviation of negative daily returns, 
equivalent to semi-variance, for each banking stock (see Low, 2004): 
                                                          
6 We also use conditional VaR (CVaR) and Merton distance-to-default (DD) as alternative indicators of banking risk for further 
validation and robustness. 
7 We also collect data for realized skewness and kurtosis as additional controls in the regressions; our findings are robust to the 
inclusion of these variables. The effect of AMBbanking on systemic banking risk is also generally maintained when separately 












                                                               (7) 
where 𝐷𝑅𝑡,𝑇
𝐵  is the downside volatility of bank B calculated using returns from time t to option maturity T, 𝑟𝑖
𝐵,𝑑
 is the 
downside logarithmic return of bank B on day i, and N is the number of observations. From this, the weighted average 
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Systematic Risk (EBETA). EBETA for each bank is computed as (see Alexander, 2001): 
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𝐵 is the return of bank B on day t, 𝑟𝑡
𝑀 is the return on the market index (S&P 500), 𝜆 is a persistence parameter of 
the historical covariance between bank B returns and index returns, and ?̂?𝑡
𝜆,𝐵
 is bank B’s systematic risk. The 
weighted average EBETA for the set of major banks examined is then obtained as follows: 





                                                               (10) 
Credit Risk (CR). CR is computed by taking the annualized ex-post sample standard deviation of daily changes of 
the 3-month ICE LIBOR rate (see Alessandri and Nelson, 2015): 









                                                          (11) 
where  𝐶𝑅𝑡,𝑇 is the volatility of the 3-month LIBOR rate changes from time t to T, 𝑟𝑖
𝐿 is the logarithmic change of 
the 3-month LIBOR rate, 𝑟𝑡,𝑇
𝐿̅̅ ̅̅  is the average logarithmic change from time t to T, and N is the number of observations. 






3.2.2. Explanatory variables 
Ambiguity (AMB). Based on Eqs. (2-5) and market capitalization weighting, we use systemic banking indicators that 
capture option investors’ ambiguity about the banking sector’s prospects (represented by the twelve major or too-
big-to-fail U.S. banks). We rely on the market capitalization of each bank to reflect its weight and size in the sector.  
Our aggregate CU-based indicators of ambiguity (AMBCU,banking) elicited from calls and puts for too-big-to-
fail institutions are, respectively, as follows: 




𝑖  , 0 < 𝐴𝑀𝐵𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠
𝐶𝑈,𝐵 < 1                                           (12) 




𝑖  , 0 < 𝐴𝑀𝐵𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑈,𝐵 < 1                                      (13) 




− 0.5| + |𝐴𝑀𝐵𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑈,𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔
− 0.5| )/2               (14)                    
where wi is the weight per major bank B in the sample, and AMB
CU,B from Eq. (4) is the degree of ambiguity elicited 
from call and put options written on B’s stock under CU. AMBCU,B for bank B is backed-out by dynamically 
minimizing the distance between observed options prices and model intrinsic values such that (and in line with Eq. 
(4)): 
                                         𝐴𝑀𝐵𝑡,𝑇
𝐶𝑈,𝐵 = 𝑂−1(𝑋, 𝑆𝑡
𝐵, 𝑇, 𝑟𝑡,  𝛿𝑡
𝐵, µ𝑡
𝐵, 𝜎𝑡
𝐵)0<𝑐<1                                   (15) 
where O-1  stands for the inverse of the Choquet-based option pricing functions (Eqs. (2-3)) given in Section 2.1. 
Composite score AMBCUSUMDEV is the sum of deviations from the unambiguous benchmark score of 0.5 and reflects 
the overall level of Choquet ambiguity characterizing systemic banks in the options market.  
Similarly, under the α-MEP specification: 




𝑖  , 0 < 𝐴𝑀𝐵𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠
𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎,𝐵 < 1                     (16)                                 




𝑖  , 0 < 𝐴𝑀𝐵𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠
𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎,𝐵 < 1                     (17)                          






 ) /2                     (18)                             
where wi is as defined before, and AMB
alpha,B is the ambiguity attitude (i.e., pessimism) elicited from call and put 
options written on B’s stock. AMBalpha,B for bank B is backed-out by inverting Eq. (5). Composite score AMBalphaSUM 
captures the overall degree of ambiguity pessimism in the (systemic) banking options market. 
Applicable to both call and put options transactions, the AMBbanking indicators reflect investors’ ambiguity 
concerning the prospects of the U.S. banking sector and particularly its twelve systemic or too-big-to-fail institutions. 
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Accounting for option moneyness considerations (OTM and ITM), both sets of indicators consider when S > X (or 
X < S) depending on whether we are dealing with call or put options (i.e., upside vs. downside) prospects. Our panel 
regressions analysis and associated supplementary results examine the effect of ambiguity AMBB per bank on 
systemic risk. This is achieved for further validation and to provide additional insights into the ambiguity-bank 
performance linkage. As discussed above, EUUP-based AMBBI from Eq. (6) is used for robustness and is elicited 
from IYF (SPX) data when compared against AMBCU and AMBalpha (AMBCUSUMDEV and AMB
alpha
SUM) dynamics.  
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
In order to isolate the effect of ambiguity on systemic banks’ risks, we control for standard banking performance 
determinants from the financial options markets literature (Swidler and Wilcox, 2002; Friesen et al., 2012), such as 
implied volatility, skewness, volatility of volatility, and option market liquidity and size. We use standard implied 
volatility (IV) as a banking risk determinant and employ option-based control variables for liquidity, fat tail risk, and 
volatility of volatility through open-interest (OI) data, the CBOE SKEW index (SKEW) and the standard deviation 
of VIX (SDVIX) respectively (see Appendix C for variables specification). Capturing investors’ forward-looking risk 
expectations (Poon and Granger, 2003) and helping to distinguish risk-related perceptions from ambiguity behavior, 
IV is computed as the weighted average option implied volatility for the set of banks examined. Proxying for size 
and liquidity effects, OI is calculated as the aggregated open-interest (calls and puts) for the twelve banks studied. 
Accounting for so-called unk-unks, or volatility of volatility effects, SDVIX is computed as the annualized standard 
deviation of daily changes in VIX (commonly known as the ‘fear gauge’) based on a 22-day moving estimation 
window. Reflecting tail risk and containing potential risk aversion information not captured by VIX, SKEW is 
obtained from the CBOE SKEW index. For further robustness, we also verify if our conclusions hold over longer 
time periods and after controlling for NBER recessions.  
 As aggregate measures of investors’ tendency to deviate from Bayesian valuation, our AMBbanking scores 
should help explain fluctuations in banking risk beyond those captured by the above (daily and monthly) measures 
and controls. We use multivariate regression analysis in our empirical tests concerning Hypothesis 1 (H1), and also 
employ variance decomposition to verify whether ambiguity effects are more pronounced in more uncertain times 
and analyze how its effects on banking risk vary across uncertainty regimes (Hypothesis 2: H2). The effect of 





3.3.1. Multivariate regression specification 
To examine the effect of ambiguity on systemic banking risk, we test the following (daily and monthly) lead-lag 
time-series option-based regression models:  
         𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡+1,𝑇
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔




+ 𝛽3𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝐼𝑡
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔
+𝛽5𝑆𝐷𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝑡+1           (19)   
where  𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡+1,𝑇
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔
 is the risk of the twelve systemic banks examined,   𝐴𝑀𝐵𝑡,𝑇
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔
 is our systemic banking 
indicator of ambiguity (i.e., from Eqs. (12-14) under CU and Eqs. (16-18) under α-MEP) elicited from observed call 
and put option prices written on these banks’ stocks (based on AMBs from Eqs. (4) and (5)) and using AMBBI from 
the IYF ETF (i.e., Eq. (6)), and 𝐼𝑉𝑡,𝑇
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔
 stands for the option implied volatility of these banks. 𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 , 
𝑂𝐼𝑡
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔
 and 𝑆𝐷𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 are controls for other option-related information (fat tail, size and liquidity, and volatility of 
volatility effects, respectively). Eq. (19) tests the effect of ambiguity on systemic bank risk after controlling for 
option-based risk, tail risk, liquidity risk and size, and volatility of volatility dynamics in the regressions.8 Eq. (19) is 
compared to the risk-based multivariate regression specification, without the AMB terms, for hypothesis validation. 
Newey and West (1987) (NW) adjusted standard errors are used to correct for potential autocorrelation issues in the 
daily data.9 Our analysis is applied on daily data (2003-2006 vs. 2007-2009) and then repeated on monthly data 
(2003-2009) for robustness. Panel regression analysis (based on Eq. (19) but controlling for fixed effects and bank-
specific information) is also implemented for additional validation. To mitigate cross-section dependence concerns 
associated with panel data (see Pesaran, 2004), we employ and report cross-sectional dependence robust standard 
errors based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998) in our bank-specific panel regressions.  
 
3.3.2. Variance decomposition 
We use variance decomposition to examine the relative influence of ambiguity (AMBbanking), compared with other 
explanatory variables, on U.S. systemic banking risk across two different uncertainty regimes, namely 2003-2006 vs. 
                                                          
8 Adding these control variables in the regressions should help reduce potential confounding effects from alternative economic 
explanations (e.g., skewness, liquidity, unk-unk and risk aversion). 
9  Following Christensen and Prabhala (1998), heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are 
employed based on Newey and West (1987) to account for autocorrelation issues in the daily data. Serial correlations in 
regression residuals were detected and confirmed by the Breusch–Godfrey LM tests. Lag selections are based on Andrews 
(1991). In line with Sun et al. (2008) and Bekaert and Hoerova (2014), our results are also robust to standard error adjustments 
using longer lag lengths of 60 (2*overlapped period) based on the extent of overlapping in the construction of our systemic 
measures (see Christensen and Prabhala, 1998). 
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2007-2009. We employ the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) approach, due to co-integration, to 
measure the proportion of subsequent variable variance due to own shocks (i.e., DR, EBETA, CR) vs. shocks from 
other variables (i.e., AMB, IV, SKEW, OI, SDVIX). Underlying the FEVD is a standard vector error correction model 
(VEC) of the form: 








+ 𝑘,𝑡                                         (20) 
where ∆𝑌𝑘,𝑡 is the first difference of the dependent variable at time t, ∆𝑋𝑗,𝑡−𝑖 is the i-step lagged first difference of 
independent variable j, k is the total number of variables in the VEC system, and n is the total number of lags. The 
portion of variance 𝑣𝑎𝑟(∆𝑌𝑘,𝑡+𝑛 − ∆𝑌𝑘,𝑡+𝑛|𝑡) due to shocks from 𝑘 is: 













                                                               (21) 
We expect ambiguity to matter most during periods of crisis-induced turbulence and economic stress and that the 
relative effect of the AMB factor on banking risk should be more pronounced during the 2007-2009 crisis. More 
generally, the elicited ambiguity information should contribute to financial system instability through the above 
dynamics. This should be reflected in the relative variance proportions of AMBbanking vis-à-vis other variables. The 
above should help validate whether investors and option holders’ ambiguity behavior is associated with shifts in U.S. 
banking risk. For ease of exposition we use a principal component factor AMBPCA, computed as the first component 
of AMBCU, AMBalpha-MEP and AMBBI, as our ambiguity proxy in the variance decomposition. 
 
4. Empirical findings 
This section presents our results along with descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and the evolution of investors’ 
ambiguity over the seven-year period 2003-2009. Through Eq. (19), we test whether AMBbanking is a determinant of 
systemic risk beyond other standard option and market information. In line with H1, we verify if ambiguity from call 
and put prospects increases downside, systematic beta and credit risks. We test our hypotheses using daily and 
monthly data. For robustness, we verify if ambiguity from IYF (SPX) data is also positively associated with systemic 
banking risk. Our variance decomposition analysis (Eqs. (20-21)) further examines whether the effect of ambiguity 
on banking risk is more pronounced in times of crisis-induced turbulence, and to what degree ambiguity matters as a 
source of risk and financial instability (see H2). Implications for the real economy and findings on linkages between 
our ambiguity proxies and economic activity are covered in Section 4.3. 
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4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the explanatory variables used in our multivariate models 
in Eq. (19). AMBbanking estimates for calls (and puts) are highly correlated (0.70 < ρ < 0.85) across periods and option 
moneyness levels.10 This holds under both CU and α-MEP ambiguity specifications (Columns 5-7 for AMBCU and 
Columns 9-11 for AMBalpha-MEP). This corroborates the consistency of our measures of ambiguity and suggests that 
moneyness considerations may not cause major shifts in ambiguity perceptions in our banking investors’ context. 
We also observe that under CU call-derived AMBs are negatively correlated with their put counterparts, suggesting 
that different CU preferences might exist among call and put option holders (Columns 5-6). Relatively lower 
correlations in ambiguity pessimism are also observed between AMBalphacalls and AMB
alpha
puts (Columns 9-10). As 
expected, we find that option-based AMB values are more pronounced (i.e., showing higher deviations from the 
Bayesian benchmark for both puts ( 𝐴𝑀𝐵𝐶𝑈̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  = 0.35, 𝐴𝑀𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎−𝑀𝐸𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  = 0.85) and calls ( 𝐴𝑀𝐵𝐶𝑈̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  = 0.73, 
𝐴𝑀𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎−𝑀𝐸𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.92)) compared to risk-neutrality during 2007-2009 than in 2003-2009. The mean AMBBIIYF score 
from IYF is also found to be higher in 2007-2009 (𝐴𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  = 1.50) than in 2003-2009 (𝐴𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 1.06). Further 
analysis suggests that during 2007-2009(10) put option holders were more ambiguous than during 2003-2006. 
Similarly, during 2007-2009(10) call option holders were more ambiguous than in 2003-2006. This underscores 
increasing uncertainty and potential disagreement among investors during our period of study. 
The above confirms the presence of ambiguity among market investors, suggesting that partial ignorance, 
speculative behavior and fear of uncertainty might lie behind the surge in U.S. banking risk characterizing the 2007-
2009 period. Figure 1 illustrates these dynamics, tracking systemic banks’ market capitalization and banking 
investors’ ambiguity behavior under CU (Figure 1a), α-MEP (Figure 1b) and EUUP (Figure 1c) from 2003 to 2010. 
The more turbulent 2007-2009 period (shaded area) is characterized by more severe losses in banks’ market values. 
These patterns are accompanied by significant variations in ambiguity and higher ambiguity levels throughout the 
period. This suggests that fluctuations in systemic banking risk might be partly explained by variations in banking 
investors’ ambiguity and severe behavioral deviations from Bayesian valuation and risk-neutrality.  
[Insert Table 1 about here]  
                                                          
10 Our AMBCU indicators are highly correlated with two popular proxies for disagreement and uncertainty in economics: the 
University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (|ρ| > .64) and the macroeconomic uncertainty indicators (|ρ| > .68) of Jurado 
et al. (2015), highlighting the relevance and reliability of our ambiguity measures and the weight of systemic banks in the U.S. 
economy. High absolute correlations are also obtained between AMBalpha-mep (AMBBI) and the aforementioned proxies (.32 < |ρ| 
< .71); the correlations are more positive for composite ambiguity scores AMBCUSUMDEV and AMBalphaSUM (.50 < |ρ| < .81). 
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
4.2. Multivariate findings 
4.2.1. Daily regression results 
Table 2 reports our base-case regression findings for 2003-2009 on the daily relationship between ambiguity and 
banking risk after controlling for standard market determinants. Herein, we use composite indicators of ambiguity 
(AMBCUSUMDEV and AMB
alpha
SUM), based on Eqs. (14) and (18), which capture deviations from Bayesian valuation for 
both calls and puts at the same time. Choquet-based AMBCUSUMDEV is the sum of absolute deviations of AMBputs and 
AMBcalls from the unambiguous score of 0.5 and proxies for the overall level of ambiguity characterizing systemic 
banks in the options market. MEP-based AMBalphaSUM proxies for the overall degree of ambiguity pessimism in the 
(systemic) banking options market. For EUUP-based AMBBI, and also for comparability with other composite 
indicators, we elicit ambiguity information from SPX to estimate the degree of ambiguity surrounding the S&P500 
index. Our remaining tables (Tables 3-8) use AMBBIIYF inferred from IYF. In Table 2, Models 1-8 are concerned with 
downside risk (DR), Models 9-14 cover systematic risk (EBETA), and Models 15-23 examine credit risk (CR). We 
contrast OTM and ITM specifications without and with ambiguity. As EUUP-based AMBBI uses comparable inputs 
and partly similar underlying information as EBETA in its calculation, causing multicollinearity and endogeneity, we 
do not report EBETA results for this ambiguity proxy. We find, however, that AMBBI is positively associated with 
CVaR when the latter is used as alternative systemic banking risk proxy. In Table 2, AMBCUSUMDEV is positively 
associated with systemic banks’ risk after controlling for other option-related information and market determinants. 
This holds for DR (p < 0.01), EBETA (p < 0.01) and CR (p < 0.05). Comparable conclusions are reached under α-
MEP regarding DR (p < 0.01), EBETA (p < 0.01) and CR (p < 0.05). The only minor difference is OTM-based Model 
19 where the AMBalphaSUM-CR association is positive but insignificant. This is explained by the crash risk 
characteristics of OTM puts and the potential daily information overlap between put option-elicited AMBalpha and 
SDVIX. When the latter is omitted from the regression, the AMBalphaSUM-CR effect becomes positive and significant 
(Model 20, p < 0.01). Overall, we find that option-elicited ambiguity (AMBbanking) is positively associated with 
downside risk, systematic and credit risks. EUUP-based AMBBISPX provides similar conclusions for DR and CR (p < 
0.01). The above evidence supports our baseline hypothesis H1 on the positive effect of ambiguity on systemic 
banking risk and confirms that banking investors’ subjective behavior, in the form of AMBbanking, was a significant 
determinant of banking risk during the 2003-2009 period. This pattern is also observed in our panel regressions on 
the effect of ambiguity per bank (AMBCU,BSUMDEV and AMB
alpha,B
SUM) on systemic bank risk (see supplementary Table 
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S1).11 Our supplementary findings in Table S2 confirm that the positive association between ambiguity (AMBBISPX), 
elicited using SPX data over the 1999-2015 period, and systemic banking risk holds for longer time-windows. We 
find this effect to be more significant during NBER recessions. 
[Insert Table 2 about here]  
Overall period 
Primarily concerned with AMBbankingcalls and AMB
banking
puts, Tables 3-5 examine similar effects as in Table 2 for DR, 
EBETA and CR but differentiate between call and put transactions over 2003-2009, 2003-2006 and 2007-2009. 
AMBCU-DR and AMBCU-CR effects are reported in Tables 3 and 5 (Panels A), while Panels B of Tables 3 and 5 
present α-MEP and AMBBI results. Table 4 summarizes systematic risk EBETA findings for AMBCU and AMBalpha-MEP 
only. This is due to the aforementioned measurement and input characteristics of the AMBBI proxy, which this time 
is elicited from IYF data for consistency with the call/put-specific banking scores covered in Tables 3-5. The 2003-
2009 sample results (Tables 3-5: Models 1-4, and Models 1-6 in Table 4) are in line with those documented in Table 
2. Significant improvements in Adj. R2 are observed when comparing AMB-based specifications against those 
without ambiguity. AMBbanking is positively (negatively) associated with systemic banks’ risk (performance). This 
holds for both call and put option transactions. Under CU, ambiguity from calls (AMBCUcalls) is significantly positively 
associated with downside, credit and systematic risks (Tables 3-5: Overall Period) after controlling for IV, SKEW, 
OI and SDVIX. For puts, ambiguity (AMBCUputs) is similarly positively associated with DR (Table 3 Panel A), EBETA 
(Table 4) and CR (Table 5 Panel A) after controlling for other option-based market factors (p < 0.05).12 Similar 
patterns are observed under α-MEP in Panels B of Tables 3 and 5, and in Table 4. AMBalphacalls is positively associated 
with DR (p < .01), EBETA (p < .01) and CR (p < .05). The same holds for AMBalphaputs for DR (p < .01) and EBETA 
(p < .01) (Table 3 Panel B and Table 4). For CR, positive but sometimes marginally significant associations are 
observed in Table 5 Panel B (Models 1-2: Puts). In line with Table 2, the significance of AMBalphaputs is reestablished 
in the CR regressions when SDVIX is omitted from the puts-based information structure. This is once again explained 
by daily information overlap caused by the volatility of volatility proxy. Moreover, we find the AMBalpha-CR effect 
to be positive and significant when DD is used as an alternative CR proxy (unreported). The above results confirm 
that positive changes in ambiguity are associated with negative shifts in systemic banking performance. Panels B of 
                                                          
11 Our panel regression findings also hold when using CVaR and Merton’s distance-to-default measure as alternative proxies for 
systemic bank risk. As the panel regression analysis is firm-specific, LIBOR-related specifications are not applicable. 
12 Under CU, ambiguity aversion declines with an increasing AMBCU score, so a negative coefficient on AMBCU,banking in Eq. (19) 
implies a positive effect of ambiguity on banking risk. 
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Tables 3 and 5 provide similar conclusions under EUUP using the AMBBIIYF score (p < .01). These patterns are again 
confirmed in our panel regressions on the effect of AMBB on systemic bank risk (see supplementary Table S1). This 
corroborates Hypothesis 1. Our conclusions tend to hold after controlling for NBER recessions. 
[Insert Tables 3-5 about here] 
Stable period 
Tables 3-5 also contrast the more stable (2003-2006) period to the later turbulent crisis period (2007-2009) using 
daily data. Models 5-12 (7-18) in Tables 3 and 5 (Table 4) present related results based on Eq. (19), examining the 
daily dynamics of the various AMBbanking indicators for calls and puts, respectively, after controlling for option-based 
IV, SKEW, OI and SDVIX. The 2003-2006 stable period findings (Models 5-8 in Tables 3 and 5, and Models 7-12 in 
Table 4) confirm that IV was a significant determinant of systemic risk for puts and calls as documented in previous 
literature (e.g., Swidler and Wilcox, 2002). This is in line with our base-case regressions in Table 2 and findings from 
Models 1-4 (1-6) in Tables 3 and 5 (Table 4). In accord with Friesen et al. (2012), the SKEW index is negatively 
associated with DR, EBETA and CR. OI is negatively correlated with DR (Table 3 Panels A and B), but not with 
systematic and credit risks (Tables 4-5). Volatility of volatility, capturing “unk-unk” dynamics, is negatively 
(positively) associated with downside and credit risks during 2003-2006 (2003-2009: Models 1-4). AMBbanking elicited 
from calls and puts - under both CU and α-MEP - is generally not a consistently significant determinant of downside 
risk during the more stable period 2003-2006 (Table 3 Panels A and B: Stable Period), suggesting that downside risk 
considerations are likely to be more relevant during uncertain market trading periods. An interesting finding is that 
AMBBI, which captures the degree of probabilistic ambiguity in IYF, is negatively associated with downside risk in 
2003-2006. This might be due to the less robust lead-lag dynamics (compared to options markets) between ETF 
markets and underlying counterparts, and the tracking features of ETF investments. AMBs provide some incremental 
information to the EBETA (Table 4) and CR regressions (Table 5 Panels A and B), indicating that investor ambiguity 
was already contributing to significant changes in systemic banks’ risk prior to the 2007-2009 crisis. Option-related 
AMBs (CU- and α-MEP-based) tend to have positive associations with systematic and credit risks after controlling 
for other effects during the stable (2003-2006) period (Table 4: Models 7-12, and Table 5: Models 5-8). In line with 
DR results, EUUP-based AMBBI once again shows a negative effect on CR during this stable period. In general, 






By contrast, during the crisis period of 2007-2009 when ambiguity is more prevalent (Tables 3 and 5: Models 9-12, 
and Models 13-18 in Table 4), we find that after controlling for other effects and relevant daily market factors, AMBs 
are consistently highly significant adding important incremental information and explanatory power (higher adj. R2) 
in line with our predictions (Tables 3-5: Uncertain Period). Higher and more significant coefficients for all AMBbanking 
proxies are also observed throughout. AMBbanking from call options (AMBcalls) has a significant positive effect on banks’ 
DR (p < 0.05) (Table 3 Panels A and B: Models 9-12), EBETA (p < 0.01) (Table 4: Models 13-18) and CR (p < 0.05) 
(Table 5 Panels A and B: Models 9-12) during the turbulent 2007-2009 period. This provides support for Hypothesis 
2 on the moderating role of economic uncertainty in the relationship between ambiguity and systemic banking risk. 
CU results suggest that, due to higher ambiguity (higher AMBCU,banking scores), call option positions on major U.S. 
banking stocks might have been subject to speculation and erratic behavior during the 2007-2009 recession and its 
aftermath (downside market and crisis-induced turbulence). For put option holders, we confirm that under CU 
ambiguity (AMBCUputs) had a significant positive effect on downside (p < 0.05), systematic (market beta) (p < 0.01) 
and credit risks (p < 0.05). This provides further support for H2 and implies that higher ambiguity from puts (i.e., 
lower AMBCU,banking scores and higher distance from the benchmark value of 0.5), with possibly higher demand for 
self-insurance, was associated with higher banking risk (Tables 3-5 Panels A and Table 4). Table 4 and Panels B of 
Tables 3 and 5 generally corroborate these findings for α-MEP and EUUP-based AMBBI. AMBalphacalls is significantly 
positively associated with DR (p < 0.05), EBETA (p < 0.01) and CR (p < 0.05). For puts, AMBalphaputs have positive 
effects on DR (t = 1.752, p = .080), EBETA (p < 0.01) and CR (p < 0.05) (after omitting SDVIX from OTM-based 
CR Model 9). The same conclusions hold for AMBBIIYF regarding downside risk and credit risk (p < 0.01). Similar 
results are obtained for DD and CVaR (unreported). The above underscores the role of ambiguity in call and put 
option transactions and shows that investor subjective behavior can induce adverse effects on banking performance 
during periods when markets are fraught with uncertainty. Overall, ambiguity (AMBbanking) from banking equity 
options markets has exacerbated the level of risk present in the U.S. banking system during the 2007-2009 period. 
This finding is robust to alternative specifications of ambiguity. It also empirically validates recent theoretical insights 
by Dicks and Fulghieri (2019) on uncertainty aversion and systemic risk.  
Similar outcomes are obtained when examining the effects of the composite systemic indicators of ambiguity 
(AMBCU,bankingSUMDEV and AMB
alpha.banking
SUM) over 2007-2009 (unreported). Our results are further robust to option 
moneyness differences and to using volatility rather than price as an input for AMB estimation. Using the Merton 
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distance-to-default measure as an alternative proxy for credit risk also does not alter our conclusions on the adverse 
effect of ambiguity on systemic bank risk.  
In terms of transmission mechanisms, we find using variance decomposition that ambiguity affects systemic 
banking risk (via m and s in CU and m only under MEP) through all valuation channels (r, δ, µ and σ) and that no 
single factor unequivocally dominates.13  While the diffusion channel plays a non-negligible role under CU in 
uncertain times, it does not drive our results (verified using a residual-based AMB after regressing AMBCU on 
volatility). The same holds for other channels. Consistent residual-based findings are also obtained under α-MEP and 
EUUP (i.e., no single factor dominates). Ambiguity should affect the various channels non-linearly (see Eq. (1)). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
4.2.2. Monthly regression results 
For robustness, we repeat the analysis using monthly data for the 2003-2009 period. Table 6 presents our monthly 
regression results summarizing the effect of the AMBCU,banking indicators on systemic bank risk for call, put and overall 
options transactions (Models 3-6, 9-12 and 15-18). Models 1-6 cover downside risk (DR), Models 7-12 examine 
systematic beta risk (EBETA) and Models 13-18 are concerned with credit risk (CR). Given that ambiguity behavior 
should be more prevalent in higher frequency data, the predictive powers of the monthly AMBs are not always as 
high as in the daily counterparts. Despite this, our predictions also hold using monthly data. Results confirm that, 
after controlling for implied volatility, skewness, option market liquidity and volatility of volatility dynamics, higher 
ambiguity (AMBbankingputs) is generally associated with higher banking risk for put contracts (Models 3-4, 9-10 and 
15-16). For call options, ambiguity (AMBbankingcalls) has a significant positive effect on DR, EBETA and CR (Models 
3-4, 9-10 and 15-16). This holds even after controlling for crisis effects (with a dummy variable). We find similar 
patterns for the composite indicator of ambiguity AMBCUSUMDEV (Models 5-6, 11-12 and 17-18). Supplementary Table 
S3 presents results for the α-MEP and EUUP specifications. Findings are consistent throughout and robust to these 
two alternative ambiguity specifications (in line with Tables 2-6). These monthly results validate our previous daily 
findings, suggesting that ambiguity-related deviations from Bayesian valuation and risk-neutrality were associated 
with the sharp shifts in risk that occurred in the U.S. banking sector during 2003-2009 (with such adverse effects 
lasting at least up to one month). These findings again validate our predictions based on Eqs. (2-6) and our hypotheses. 
                                                          
13 For example over 2003-2009, we find that under CU the proportion of DR (EBETA) variance explained by r’ (δ’) is on average 
higher than the proportions of variance explained by sσ and δ’(sσ and r’). On the other hand, the proportion of CR variance 
explained by sσ is, on average, higher than the proportions explained by r’ and δ’. For MEU, r’ and σ explain CR variance better 
than δ’ while the latter explains EBETA better than former two. Additionally, we find no major differences in variance proportions 
explained by adjustment factors m and s vis-à-vis systemic banking risk under CU. 
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We conclude that ambiguity (AMBbanking) has been a significant determinant of systemic risk in the U.S. over our 
period of study.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
4.2.3. Variance decomposition results 
This section presents our variance decomposition results on how investor ambiguity dynamics compare across low 
vs. high uncertainty regimes and further examines feedback effects among the different variables used in our 
regressions. As mentioned, we use the first principal component (AMBPCA) of AMBCU,banking, AMBalpha,banking and 
AMBBIIYF as our ambiguity proxy herein. Our predictions based on Eqs. (20-21) and H2 suggest that the relative effect 
of ambiguity on systemic banking risk should be more pronounced during periods of high uncertainty and economic 
stress. Table 7 (Panels A-C) presents our daily variance decomposition results for the stable period 2003-2006 vs. 
the more uncertain 2007-2009 period. Each entry in the tables denotes the percentage of forecast error variance of 
variables on the left-hand side explained by the variables at the top (using average moneyness). Entries converge in 
a 250-day horizon. The tables show that the proportion of banking risk variance that can be explained by its own 
shock generally declines during the crisis. This indicates that shocks from other variables, in particular AMBPCA and 
IV, are more prominent in explaining banking risk during the crisis than before. More importantly, we find that the 
proportions of DR (Table 7 Panel A: Columns 3 & 9), EBETA (Table 7 Panel B: Columns 3 & 9) and CR (Table 7 
Panel C: Columns 3 & 9) variances explained by AMBPCA increase significantly during the crisis compared to the 
more stable 2003-2006 period, and that ambiguity behavior is a leading source of systemic risk in the U.S. banking 
system during 2007-2009. This holds for both put and call transactions.14 On average, AMB from calls explains 
around 10% of systemic banking risk variance during 2007-2009 vs. only 2% over 2003-2006. For put options, AMB 
on average explains 7.5% of banking risk variance during the crisis vs. 0.48% in the earlier stable period. AMB from 
puts is the most important “external” source of credit risk during the crisis. Given the context of the 2007-2009 
recession, this is not surprising. The above validates and corroborates hypothesis H2. Finally, AMBPCA seems to 
influence, and tends to be influenced by, more variables during the crisis than previously, highlighting the presence 
of feedback loops/effects across the banking industry and increasing risk and financial instability. The above confirms 
that ambiguity is an important source of systemic banking risk in the U.S. and that tracking and monitoring the 
subjective behavior of investors can help detect or anticipate signs of banking stress, downside performance, and 
                                                          
14 Most of these results hold under each ambiguity specification. Similar to the sub-sections covering our multivariate regression 
results, the 2003-2009 variance decomposition findings for AMB were in line with their 2007-2009 counterparts. 
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instability. In sum, ambiguity matters greatly in the marketplace especially in times of crisis-induced turbulence and 
heightened financial uncertainty.  
The next section summarizes implications for the real economy and provides additional empirical evidence 
on the negative effect of ambiguity on economic outcomes. As market-elicited ambiguity is positively related to 
systemic banks’ risk and increases financial system instability, our AMBbanking indicators should have negative 
repercussions on the real economy and influence corporate policy.  
 
4.3. Economic activity implications 
Monthly univariate regressions are implemented to test the lagged association between investors’ ambiguity 
AMBbanking and economic activity. To gain additional insights into the linkages between financial markets, the banking 
sector and the real economy, we also examine the effect of systemic banking risk (SBR) on real economic activity 
indicators (i.e., accounting for potential endogeneity). Our analysis involves the use of monthly AMBbanking and SBR 
data as explanatory variables. Economic activity indicators serving as our dependent variables, therefore, consist of: 
capacity utilization growth (CUG) measuring monthly industrial production, total non-farm payroll growth (TNPG) 
as an indicator of monthly employment, and changes in the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) as a proxy 
for overall economic performance on a monthly basis. Table 8 (Panels A-C) summarizes our results. 
Table 8 Panel A presents findings on the real economy implications of ambiguity under CU, while Panel B 
reports AMBalpha and AMBBIIYF results. Panel C summarizes systemic banking risk effects specific to CU. Table S4 
reports SBR findings under α-MEP and EUUP. All AMBbanking indicators in Panel A are found to be negatively 
associated with economic activity, confirming that ambiguity has adverse effects on the real economy. Capacity 
utilization, total non-farm payrolls and the CFNAI all decrease with increasing ambiguity. Call option-elicited 
ambiguity AMBCU,bankingcalls has a negative effect on industrial production (p < 0.05), hiring (p < 0.05) and overall 
economic output (p < 0.01). Higher (lower) ambiguity from puts AMBCU,bankingputs is also negatively (positively) 
associated with real activity (p < 0.01). Finally, AMBCUSUMDEV (proxying for the overall degree of ambiguity in the 
systemic banking option market) shows consistently significantly negative effects on CUG, TNPG and the CFNAI 
(p < 0.01). Our results are robust to the α-MEP and EUUP ambiguity specifications (Panel B). These findings are in 
line with economic theory predictions on the negative role of uncertainty in real economic activity (e.g., real options, 
precautionary saving and financial frictions arguments) and accord with recent macro evidence by Berger et al. (2017) 
and Berger and Sedunov (2017) on linkages among economic policy uncertainty, bank liquidity creation and real 
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economic output. Our results suggest that measures and policies reducing the level of subjective behavior and 
ambiguity in the financial markets can help to enhance aggregate economic activity. 
Panel C reports our systemic banking risk (SBR) results under CU. We use both direct (raw) measures of 
systemic banking risk (DR, EBETA and CR) and predicted SBR measures (based on Eq. (19)). For robustness and to 
mitigate endogeneity concerns (see e.g., Berger and Bouwman, 2013),15 we also verify that our main results hold 
under GMM using an instrumental approach. Findings confirm that systemic banking risk is consistently negatively 
associated with the three important aspects of economic activity we consider. Industrial production, hiring and overall 
economic output all decrease with higher systemic banking risk. An interesting finding is that, in most regression 
cases under CU (except for DR as a predictor of CUG), the predicted SBR measures display more negative coefficients 
than their raw counterparts. Supplementary Tables S4 and S5 display comparable patterns. This suggests that the 
determinants of systemic banking risk (including AMBbanking), and the associated feedback loops, might be more 
important in depressing economic activity than SBR itself. SBR might, thus, serve as a “medium” between the 
financial markets and the real economy. This is in line with research by Bartram et al. (2007) on the measurement 
and role of systemic risk in the global financial system.  
Overall, our above findings confirm that ambiguity, measured under CU, α-MEP and EUUP, can depress 
real economic activity and influence corporate policy. Such an adverse effect is mostly reflected in industrial 
production, employment and aggregate economic performance. This additional evidence underscores the weight of 
systemic banks in the economy, the role of subjective behavior and cognitive limitations in the operations of financial 
markets, and the detrimental effect of investors’ ambiguity biases on the financial system and the real economy. 
Importantly, we document that ambiguity from the financial markets and systemic banking risk did bring losses to 
the US economy during the 2003-2009 period.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
This paper provides evidence on the consequences of investors’ subjective behavior in the financial markets 
concerning the prospects of too-big-to-fail U.S. banks over the period 2003-2009. We learn that the financial options 
market is characterized by ambiguity when it comes to transactions involving systemic banks, with ambiguity 
behavior found in both put and call options instruments. This behavior is more prevalent in times of downside markets 
                                                          
15  The Hausman endogeneity test confirmed the presence of endogeneity bias in the SBR-economic activity regressions. 
Supplementary Table S5 reports GMM estimation results for this relationship using AMB and SKEW as instruments. Our GMM 
results corroborate our CU-based findings (and those under α-MEP and EUUP, unreported). 
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and financial crises. As a result of valuation biases, suboptimal option exercise and erroneous trades, ambiguity 
elicited from option pricing transactions is found to increase banks’ downside risk, systematic risk, and credit risk. 
This holds in calls and put options markets and also when ambiguity is elicited from the IYF ETF and SPX data. The 
positive relationship between investor ambiguity and systemic banking risk is moderated by economic uncertainty. 
We also confirm that distortions arising from subjective behavior, in the form of AMBbanking, in the financial markets 
can bring losses to the real economy and have adverse effects on economic activity.  
The above adds to extant literature on the role of deviating behavior and cognition in financial services and 
markets by examining the case of ‘sophisticated’ investors, unveiling the consequences of their ambiguity on the 
banking sector and the real economy. The paper also supplements extant experimental research on how ambiguity 
biases affect pricing dynamics and investment decisions in the presence of high uncertainty. We provide evidence of 
ambiguity effects in a natural market setting. Our study also relates to existing behavioral research in management 
on ambiguity and firm/industry performance (e.g., King and Zeithaml, 2001; Powell et al., 2006; Friberg and Seiler, 
2017) by highlighting how subjective behavior in the marketplace can have negative repercussions on financial 
system stability and systemic banking performance. We find that higher ambiguity among call and put option holders 
is associated with higher (lower) systemic bank risk (performance), and higher ambiguity from ETFs increases 
financial sector instability. 
In terms of practical implications, we propose simple indicators of uncertainty for systemic banking to gauge 
changing ambiguity behavior among investors over time. Eliciting investors’ ambiguity (pessimism) information 
directly from call and put option prices on major U.S. banks’ stocks, we are able to provide clear evidence of 
subjective behavior in banking equity derivatives markets and, consequently, shed light on the effects of investors’ 
biases and limited information processing around banking crises. At the policy level, our findings call for more robust 
monitoring of investment behavior, especially around times of banking instability (bubbles, crashes and crises), and 
underscore the need to incorporate behavioral economics principles in financial institutions’ financial management, 
planning and supervision. In terms of broader regulation, banking performance and risk management implications, 
our indicators of banking uncertainty and investor ambiguity can be used by bank managers as early warning signals 
for monitoring banking risk exposures and gauging investors’ behavior under different uncertainty regimes. Our 
ambiguity scores (AMBB and AMBbanking) might also serve as additional proxies for systematic turbulence and 
Knightian uncertainty in the marketplace, and as advanced warning signs of impending problems in the real economy. 
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Further research is warranted on the role and contribution of ambiguity in understanding firm performance 
and global financial markets, and its potential interactions with disagreement and sentiment effects. The impact of 
ambiguity on stock returns and other performance indicators can be examined under different data specifications 
(e.g., intraday or weekly) or using alternative behavioral frameworks. Ambiguity also affects corporate decisions and 
can be elicited from managerial reports, fundamental accounting information and mergers and acquisitions 
transactions. Studying the determinants of ambiguity (and its implications) in these various settings and contexts, and 
linking antecedents and outcomes to corporate governance and sustainability matters should generate fruitful avenues 




Appendix A. The role of ambiguity in option valuation 
No ambiguity: 
The price of the underlying bank stock S, on which the option contract is written, follows a singleton-based Brownian 
motion (e.g., Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973) of the form: 
                                                                  
𝑑𝑆
𝑆
= 𝜇𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑧                                                                                (A1) 
Because of indifference towards uncertainty, uniformity in model specification and market completeness, the 
fundamental equation to value options under risk-neutrality (with dividend yield δ) is as follows:  








𝜎2 + (𝑟 − 𝛿)
𝜕𝑂
𝜕𝑆
𝑆 − 𝑟𝑂 = 0                                                     (A2) 
The well-known BSM formula, without ambiguity adjustments, is a solution to Eq. (A2). For call options: 
                                                            𝑂 = 𝑆0𝑒
−𝛿𝑇𝑁(𝑑1)−𝑋𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2)                                                     (A2.1) 
where:                                     
   𝑑1 =
ln (
𝑆0





 and  𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎√𝑇            
Choquet ambiguity: 
The price of the underlying stock S follows the ambiguity-based Choquet (set of) Brownian motion(s), or so-called 
symmetric Choquet random walk, of the form (see e.g., Kast and Lapied, 2010; Agliardi et al., 2016): 
                                        
𝑑𝑆
𝑆
= (𝜇 +𝑚𝜎)𝑑𝑡 + 𝑠𝜎𝑑𝑧       ( ∀ 𝑚 ∈ ] − 1,1[  , ∀ 𝑠 ∈ ]0,1])                       (A3) 
Due to uncertainty in model specification and a lack of complete information about the future realizations of market 
returns and volatility (i.e., multiple distributions), m and s alter investors’ valuation, trading and option exercise 
decisions. m = 2c-1 and s2 = 4c(1-c), where c is the ambiguity score (with 0 < c < 1) indicative of investors’ ambiguity 
perceptions. Eq. (A3) has been shown to subsume alternative ambiguity frameworks from the multiple priors (MEP) 
family where m ≠ 0 and s = 1. Appendix B covers some of the main properties of the above (symmetric) Choquet 
random walk. 
Eq. (1), in Section 2.1.1, is the fundamental equation to value options under A3 (with dividend yield δ). As 
solutions to Eq. (1), Eqs. (2-3) are ambiguity-based versions of the BSM formulae under CU. When m = 0 and s = 1 
(i.e., no ambiguity), Eq. (A3) simplifies to A1 and Eqs. (2-3) revert back to the standard BSM (c = 0.5 and A2.1).    
 
Multiple priors ambiguity: 
The price of the underlying stock S, on which the option contract is written, follows the ambiguity-based multiple 
priors (set of) Brownian motion(s) of the form: 
                                                               
𝑑𝑆
𝑆
= (𝜇 +𝑚𝜎)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑧       ( ∀ 𝑚 ∈ ] − 1,1[)                                 (A4) 
Due to uncertainty in model specification and a lack of complete information about the future realizations of market 
returns, -1 < m < 1 alters investors’ valuation, trading and option exercise decisions through the drift component of 
the Brownian motion. A4 is a special case of A3. The fundamental equation to value options under A4 is nested in 
Eq. (1) (s = 1 case). Similarly, Eqs (2-3) in Section 2.1.1 subsume the multiple priors versions of the BSM formulae. 
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Appendix B. Symmetric Choquet random walk (based on Kast and Lapied (2010))  
Following Kast and Lapied (2010) and Kast et al. (2014), consider any node 𝑛𝑡  at date t (0≤t≤T) and its possible up 
or down successors next period 𝑛𝑡+1
𝑢  and 𝑛𝑡+1
𝑑  (following an “up” or a “down” move, respectively) in a dynamic 
binomial tree. The Choquet random walk is defined by a conditional capacity 𝑐  (rather than additive probabilities) 
which has the same magnitude of an “up” or “down” move from one period to the next such that:  
                                            𝑣(𝑛𝑡+1
𝑢 𝑛𝑡⁄ ) = 𝑣(𝑛𝑡+1
𝑑 𝑛𝑡⁄ ) = 𝑐 , with 0 < 𝑐 < 1                                                  (B1) 
Capacity variable 𝑐 captures the ambiguous weight or distortion in probabilities and summarizes investor ambiguity 
perceptions. The Choquet integral is employed to obtain the subjective expected value of the underlying asset price 
with respect to the specific weighted function 𝑣 or constant capacity c. The decision weights used in the computation 
of the Choquet integral will overweight high outcomes if the capacity is more concave (increasing ambiguity under 
ambiguity-seeking) and favor low outcomes if the capacity is more convex (increasing ambiguity for ambiguity 
aversion), relative to the Bayesian probabilistic case c = ½.  
Consider a random process: 𝑋 = (𝑋𝑡)𝑡∈𝑇, with random variables 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡. Let 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡+1 − 𝑋𝑡, where 𝑌𝑡 
takes the value 1 with capacity 𝑐 and −1 with capacity 1−𝑐. Satisfying the properties of the symmetric random walk 
by Kast and Lapied (2010) and Kast et al. (2014), 𝐸(𝑌𝑡) = 2𝑐 − 1 = 𝑚, 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑌𝑡] = 4𝑐(1 − 𝑐) = 𝑠
2. The resulting 
random walk converges in continuous-time to a general Wiener process with mean m and variance s2. Define a 
discrete-time process 𝑊𝑡  by: 𝑊𝑡 = 𝑚ℎ + 𝑠√ℎ𝑈𝑡 , where 𝑈𝑡  takes the value 1 with probability 1/2 and -1 with 
probability 1/2.  Then 𝐸(𝑊𝑡) = 𝑚 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑡) = 𝑠
2. The resulting Brownian motion, thus, has a distorted mean 
and distorted variance that are functions of ambiguity score c (i.e., A3). The standard Wiener process with mean zero 
and variance of 1 (i.e., c = ½) is in A1. 
Appendix C. Control variables  
Implied Volatility (IV). The Black-Scholes model (1973) is employed to back-out IV per bank as follows:  
                                            𝐼𝑉𝑡,𝑇
𝐵 = 𝐵𝑆𝑀−1(𝑋, 𝑆𝑡
𝐵, 𝑇, 𝑟𝑡 ,  𝛿𝑡
𝐵)                                      (C1) 
where BSM-1 stands for the inverse of the Black-Scholes function in A2.1. From this, the weighted average implied 
volatility for the set of banks examined is calculated as follows: 






t TIV                                                                       (C2) 
Option Market Liquidity (OI). This is aggregated open-interest computed by taking the sum of open-interest for all 
out-of-the-money (OTM) and in-the-money (ITM) call and put contracts. For example, the open-interest for OTM 
calls is: 





                                                         (C3) 
where 𝑂𝐼𝑡
𝑂𝑇𝑀 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 is the open interest of out-of-the-money calls at time t, i is the index for bank B and j is the number 
of out-of-the-money call option contracts.  
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Volatility of Volatility (SDVIX). This is computed as the annualized standard deviation of daily changes in 
VIX based on a 22-day moving estimation window: 
                                                               𝑆𝐷𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 = √∑
(𝑟𝑡+1−𝑖
𝑉𝐼𝑋 − 𝑟𝑡,𝑡−22






                                                (C4) 
where 𝑆𝐷𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 is the volatility of VIX on day t, 𝑟𝑡
𝑉𝐼𝑋 is the logarithmic change of the VIX index on day t and 𝑟𝑡,𝑡−22
𝑉𝐼𝑋̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
is the average logarithmic change of the VIX over the last 22 trading days.  
Skewness (SKEW). Capturing tail risk and risk information not contained in VIX, SKEW is obtained from the 
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Figure 1a – U.S. systemic banks market capitalization and investor ambiguity (AMBCU) under CU for calls and puts  
  
Figure 1b – U.S. systemic banks market capitalization and investor ambiguity (AMBalpha-MEP) under α-MEP for calls and puts  
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
The table reports summary statistics and correlations for the independent variables used in Eqs. (19-21). We present results for call and put options on US banks’ equities and 
for the iShares U.S. Financials ETF over 2003-2009. AMBs are obtained using Eqs. (2-6 and 12-18) under CU, α-MEP and EUUP. IV denotes implied volatility. SKEW is the 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1. IVCall.OTM 0.31 0.26 1.00
2. IVCall.ITM 0.34 0.27 0.99 1.00
3. IVPut.OTM 0.37 0.28 0.99 0.98 1.00
4. IVPut.ITM 0.35 0.26 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00
5. AMB CU Call.OTM 0.62 0.16 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.55 1.00
6. AMB CU Call.ITM 0.63 0.14 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.80 1.00
7. AMB
CU
Put.OTM 0.46 0.12 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.58 -0.60 1.00
8. AMB CU Put.ITM 0.42 0.14 -0.49 -0.51 -0.52 -0.50 -0.70 -0.65 0.70 1.00
9. AMB
alpha
Call.OTM 0.85 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.49 0.46 -0.34 -0.43 1.00
10. AMB alpha Call.ITM 0.85 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.54 0.55 -0.39 -0.47 0.85 1.00
11. AMB alpha Put.OTM 0.50 0.33 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.71 0.72 -0.63 -0.69 0.54 0.58 1.00
12. AMB
alpha
Put.ITM 0.77 0.18 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.65 0.59 -0.49 -0.68 0.63 0.54 0.82 1.00
13. AMB BI IYF 1.06 1.18 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.31 0.34 -0.46 -0.31 0.14 0.20 0.28 0.19 1.00
14. SKEW 117.72 5.37 -0.29 -0.28 -0.30 -0.27 -0.21 -0.12 0.12 0.16 -0.04 0.03 -0.24 -0.23 0.11 1.00
15. OICall.OTM 495511 751162 0.54 0.55 0.59 0.57 0.41 0.43 -0.32 -0.38 0.17 0.19 0.45 0.38 0.21 -0.18 1.00
16. OICall.ITM 190402 239505 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.16 -0.05 -0.15 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.46 1.00
17. OIPut.OTM 450033 497384 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.35 -0.20 -0.30 0.16 0.17 0.36 0.34 0.13 -0.14 0.69 0.79 1.00
18. OIPut.ITM 190402 239505 0.57 0.57 0.61 0.60 0.41 0.42 -0.34 -0.38 0.17 0.18 0.48 0.39 0.20 -0.21 0.97 0.36 0.59 1.00






Table 2 - The effect of ambiguity on systemic banking risk  
The table summarizes our 2003-2009 daily regression results based on Eq. (19). This model is compared to the multivariate structure without the AMB term. DR stands for 
systemic banks’ downside risk, EBETA is systemic banks’ market beta risk, and CR is systemic banks’ credit risk. AMBCUSUMDEV and AMBalphaSUM capture the overall degree 
of ambiguity in the systemic banking options market under CU and α-MEP (Eqs. (14) and (18)). AMBBISPX proxies for the overall degree of ambiguity characterizing the SPX 
index. IV denotes implied volatility. SKEW is the CBOE SKEW index. OI denotes open-interest information and SDVIX is the volatility of VIX. 
 
Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
1.OTM 2.ITM 3.OTM 4.ITM 5.OTM 6.ITM 7.OTM 8.ITM 9.OTM 10.ITM 11.OTM 12.ITM 13.OTM 14.ITM 15.OTM 16.ITM 17.OTM 18.ITM 19.OTM 20.OTM 21.ITM 22.OTM 23.ITM
0.317 0.437 0.193 0.345 0.153 0.214 0.582** 0.582** 2.168*** 2.323*** 1.855*** 2.115*** 1.609*** 1.682*** 0.161 0.254 0.071 0.185 0.130 -0.243 0.147 0.585* 0.585*
(1.144) (1.509) (0.743) (1.278) (0.599) (0.804) (2.037) (2.037) (5.734) (6.197) (5.677) (6.482) (5.087) (5.378) (0.547) (0.882) (0.250) (0.675) (0.458) (-0.634) (0.516) (1.892) (1.892)
1.294*** 1.351*** 1.168*** 1.231*** 1.235*** 1.307*** 1.344*** 1.344*** 1.293*** 1.313*** 0.972*** 1.042*** 1.090*** 1.188*** 0.414*** 0.413*** 0.321** 0.323** 0.402*** 0.476*** 0.392*** 0.493*** 0.493***
(12.505) (12.067) (11.851) (11.782) (12.407) (12.094) (13.368) (13.368) (12.841) (12.655) (11.588) (12.720) (10.990) (11.852) (3.455) (3.495) (2.428) (2.553) (3.199) (3.135) (3.274) (3.977) (3.977)
- - 0.663*** 0.644*** - - - - - - 1.680*** 1.466*** - - - - 0.486** 0.486** - - - - -
- - (2.914) (3.163) - - - - - - (5.068) (4.692) - - - - (2.014) (2.336) - - - - -
- - - - 0.191*** 0.268*** - - - - - - 0.650*** 0.770*** - - - - 0.018 0.155*** 0.128** - -
- - - - (3.541) (3.668) - - - - - - (7.324) (6.573) - - - - (0.804) (2.927) (2.368) - -
- - - - - - 0.060*** 0.060*** - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.095*** 0.095***
- - - - - - (3.798) (3.798) - - - - - - - - - - - - - (2.733) (2.733)
-0.004 -0.005** -0.003 -0.004* -0.003 -0.004* -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.003 -0.004* -0.002 -0.003* -0.003 0.001 -0.004* -0.008*** -0.008***
(-1.642) (-2.017) (-1.227) (-1.848) (-1.392) (-1.917) (-2.721) (-2.721) (-3.706) (-4.151) (-3.306) (-4.266) (-3.344) (-4.232) (-1.478) (-1.892) (-1.145) (-1.750) (-1.447) (0.284) (-1.827) (-2.930) (-2.930)
-0.000 -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-1.543) (-2.843) (-1.831) (-3.203) (-1.926) (-3.096) (-1.479) (-1.479) (2.175) (2.469) (1.950) (1.905) (1.718) (2.084) (1.195) (1.050) (1.056) (0.820) (1.133) (1.030) (0.961) (1.308) (1.308)
0.099** 0.084** 0.055 0.054 0.069 0.064 0.098*** 0.098*** -0.026 -0.029 -0.136** -0.098 -0.128** -0.086 0.218*** 0.223*** 0.187*** 0.200*** 0.213*** - 0.213*** 0.218*** 0.218***
(2.377) (1.961) (1.369) (1.358) (1.573) (1.476) (2.640) (2.640) (-0.424) (-0.512) (-2.083) (-1.551) (-2.128) (-1.492) (2.874) (2.920) (2.625) (2.772) (2.740) - (2.788) (3.195) (3.195)
Adj R2 75.99% 76.25% 77.45% 77.90% 76.71% 76.97% 76.59% 76.59% 65.30% 65.97% 71.12% 71.29% 70.57% 69.74% 44.12% 42.83% 45.79% 44.84% 44.15% 37.19% 43.15% 47.43% 47.43%
F 1260.129 1278.035 1093.642 1122.511 1049.293 1064.760 1041.937 1041.937 749.600 772.203 784.412 791.083 763.891 734.367 315.076 298.955 269.745 259.630 252.504 236.473 242.563 288.070 288.070
Overall Period











Table 3 Panel A - The effect of ambiguity on downside risk under CU  
The table summarizes our daily DR regression results based on Eq. (19). This model is compared to the multivariate structure without the AMB term. We contrast 2003-2006 
results (Stable Period) vs. results from 2007-2009 (Uncertain Period) for calls and puts. 2003-2009 results (Overall Period) are also reported for comparison. AMBCU is the 
elicited ambiguity indicator under CU based on Eqs. (12-13). IV denotes implied volatility. SKEW is the CBOE SKEW index. OI denotes open-interest information and SDVIX 
is the volatility of VIX. 
 
Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
 
1.OTM 2.ITM 3.OTM 4.ITM 5.OTM 6.ITM 7.OTM 8.ITM 9.OTM 10.ITM 11.OTM 12.ITM
0.397 0.440 0.104 0.222 0.346*** 0.381*** 0.335*** 0.393*** 1.737** 1.961*** 1.217* 1.464**
(1.371) (1.432) (0.410) (0.796) (3.444) (4.208) (3.310) (4.264) (2.368) (2.639) (1.752) (2.014)
0.868*** 0.818*** 0.813*** 0.749*** 0.543*** 0.505*** 0.544*** 0.501*** 0.812*** 0.764*** 0.762*** 0.710***
(11.599) (13.494) (11.564) (13.023) (4.607) (4.771) (4.626) (4.800) (12.138) (12.863) (11.311) (11.638)
- - 0.145*** 0.145*** - - 0.030 -0.053 - - 0.148*** 0.159***
- - (3.736) (3.468) - - (0.700) (-1.264) - - (3.041) (2.814)
-0.059* -0.061* -0.045 -0.059* -0.241*** -0.266*** -0.238*** -0.262*** -0.140** -0.154** -0.118** -0.138**
(-1.833) (-1.754) (-1.528) (-1.778) (-2.715) (-3.297) (-2.681) (-3.278) (-2.387) (-2.564) (-2.090) (-2.342)
-0.111** -0.057* -0.132*** -0.075** -0.059 -0.095* -0.056 -0.093* -0.202*** -0.160*** -0.223*** -0.196***
(-2.440) (-1.750) (-2.821) (-2.130) (-1.042) (-1.908) (-0.986) (-1.835) (-3.677) (-3.534) (-3.944) (-4.116)
0.111*** 0.077* 0.083** 0.056 -0.066 -0.072 -0.070 -0.070 0.067 0.010 0.053 0.001 
(2.821) (1.715) (2.169) (1.303) (-1.219) (-1.271) (-1.267) (-1.242) (1.188) (0.162) (0.997) (0.021)
Adj R
2 76.01% 74.07% 77.34% 75.48% 49.58% 47.97% 49.61% 48.19% 64.51% 61.76% 66.13% 63.64%
F 1260.889 1137.068 1087.157 980.291 248.267 232.888 199.114 188.160 266.367 236.823 229.039 205.472
0.262 0.492* 0.533* 0.600** 0.064 0.130** 0.065 0.139** 1.497** 2.127*** 1.501** 2.164***
(0.966) (1.694) (1.866) (2.026) (0.988) (2.050) (1.013) (2.231) (2.381) (2.821) (2.402) (2.895)
0.806*** 0.898*** 0.742*** 0.858*** 0.753*** 0.684*** 0.753*** 0.687*** 0.741*** 0.819*** 0.681*** 0.787***
(13.144) (11.636) (14.018) (12.018) (14.136) (11.773) (14.204) (11.542) (12.532) (12.589) (12.803) (12.545)
- - -0.142*** -0.120*** - - -0.003 -0.073 - - -0.155** -0.120**
- - (-2.794) (-2.959) - - (-0.079) (-1.580) - - (-2.326) (-2.231)
-0.046 -0.075** -0.045 -0.066** -0.032 -0.109* -0.033 -0.103* -0.123** -0.177*** -0.098* -0.165***
(-1.516) (-2.352) (-1.518) (-2.170) (-0.547) (-1.902) (-0.560) (-1.776) (-2.421) (-2.948) (-1.944) (-2.783)
0.033 -0.149*** 0.032 -0.161*** -0.062 -0.124*** -0.062 -0.126*** -0.026 -0.241*** -0.008 -0.248***
(0.673) (-3.189) (0.665) (-3.318) (-1.421) (-2.967) (-1.423) (-3.033) (-0.370) (-5.122) (-0.118) (-5.011)
0.091** 0.098** 0.056 0.070* -0.132*** -0.071 -0.132*** -0.078 0.058 0.064 0.017 0.039 
(2.098) (2.370) (1.333) (1.720) (-2.625) (-1.404) (-2.608) (-1.491) (0.897) (1.074) (0.266) (0.683)
Adj R2 75.27% 76.69% 76.57% 77.67% 64.08% 58.24% 64.04% 58.73% 60.17% 64.43% 61.93% 65.59%
F 1211.649 1309.242 1040.616 1107.734 449.612 351.804 359.347 287.316 221.595 265.475 190.997 223.640
Downside Risk (DR) Downside Risk (DR) Downside Risk (DR)




















Table 3 Panel B - The effects of ambiguity on downside risk under α-MEP and EUUP  
The table summarizes our daily DR regression results based on Eq. (19). This model is compared to the multivariate structure without the AMB term. We contrast 2003-2006 
results (Stable Period) vs. results from 2007-2009 (Uncertain Period) for calls and puts. 2003-2009 results (Overall Period) are also reported for comparison. AMBalpha-MEP 
and AMBBIIYF are the ambiguity indicators under α-MEP and EUUP based on Eqs. (16-17) and Eq. (6). IV denotes implied volatility. SKEW is the CBOE SKEW index. OI 
denotes open-interest information and SDVIX is the volatility of VIX. 
 
Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
1.OTM 2.ITM 3.OTM 4.ITM 5.OTM 6.ITM 7.OTM 8.ITM 9.OTM 10.ITM 11.OTM 12.ITM
0.280 0.310 0.871*** 0.970*** 0.306*** 0.342*** 0.288*** 0.316*** 1.588** 1.810** 2.644*** 2.872***
(1.024) (1.070) (3.072) (3.325) (3.148) (3.624) (4.116) (4.696) (2.286) (2.543) (3.771) (4.089)
1.362*** 1.206*** 1.166*** 1.029*** 0.484*** 0.398*** 0.369*** 0.294*** 1.230*** 1.111*** 0.876*** 0.769***
(11.659) (13.473) (10.202) (11.629) (5.198) (5.277) (4.384) (4.442) (12.007) (12.432) (8.243) (8.193)
0.140*** 0.236*** - - 0.025** 0.028 - - 0.208** 0.304** - -
(3.661) (4.016) - - (2.296) (1.471) - - (2.229) (2.536) - -
- - 0.069*** 0.079*** - - -0.032*** -0.033*** - - 0.102*** 0.111***
- - (4.002) (4.527) - - (-5.211) (-5.847) - - (5.165) (5.563)
-0.004* -0.005* -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.014** -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.022***
(-1.833) (-1.939) (-3.473) (-3.574) (-2.653) (-3.231) (-2.334) (-2.675) (-2.445) (-2.707) (-3.564) (-3.771)
0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(-2.517) (-1.936) (-2.308) (-2.381) (-0.771) (-2.016) (-0.425) (-0.630) (-3.757) (-3.828) (-3.952) (-3.376)
0.102** 0.065 0.084*** 0.049 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016* -0.016* 0.072 0.004 -0.041 -0.101*
(2.483) (1.400) (2.892) (1.452) (-1.469) (-1.385) (-1.748) (-1.662) (1.108) (0.052) (-0.845) (-1.919)
Adj R
2 76.39% 74.84% 78.41% 77.27% 50.50% 48.56% 56.40% 55.21% 64.80% 62.49% 71.24% 69.95%
F 1030.354 947.393 1156.379 1083.009 206.230 190.924 261.285 248.972 215.976 195.580 290.365 272.860
0.131 0.200 0.788*** 0.922*** 0.060 0.077 0.072 0.129** 1.316** 1.402** 2.332*** 2.902***
(0.516) (0.789) (2.866) (3.249) (0.917) (1.150) (1.100) (2.048) (2.132) (2.013) (3.693) (4.188)
1.087*** 1.345*** 0.971*** 1.192*** 0.685*** 0.778*** 0.611*** 0.648*** 0.992*** 1.182*** 0.659*** 0.882***
(12.815) (11.815) (10.725) (10.205) (14.227) (11.282) (10.328) (8.441) (11.841) (12.106) (6.300) (8.390)
0.143*** 0.246*** - - 0.004 0.039*** - - 0.156* 0.496*** - -
(3.370) (4.246) - - (0.432) (2.646) - - (1.752) (3.696) - -
- - 0.074*** 0.065*** - - -0.016*** -0.023*** - - 0.115*** 0.101***
- - (4.116) (3.646) - - (-3.250) (-4.618) - - (5.426) (5.032)
-0.002 -0.004** -0.008*** -0.009*** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.012** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.023***
(-1.127) (-2.006) (-3.319) (-3.832) (-0.499) (-1.460) (-0.195) (-1.154) (-2.257) (-2.597) (-3.480) (-4.059)
0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
(0.331) (-3.488) (0.991) (-2.505) (-1.477) (-3.096) (-0.856) (-2.751) (-0.598) (-5.346) (0.609) (-4.219)
0.061 0.078* 0.066** 0.074** -0.024*** -0.016* -0.024*** -0.016* 0.050 0.054 -0.061 -0.041 
(1.271) (1.800) (2.157) (2.413) (-2.641) (-1.779) (-2.725) (-1.781) (0.666) (0.817) (-1.151) (-0.827)
Adj R2 75.96% 77.49% 78.05% 78.76% 64.07% 59.86% 65.46% 61.29% 60.52% 65.76% 68.54% 70.90%






















Overall Period Stable Period Uncertain Period
Downside Risk (DR) Downside Risk (DR) Downside Risk (DR)
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Table 4 - The effect of ambiguity on systematic risk under CU and α-MEP  
The table summarizes our daily EBETA regression results based on Eq. (19). This model is compared to the multivariate structure without the AMB term. We contrast 2003-
2006 results (Stable Period) vs. results from 2007-2009 (Uncertain Period) for calls and puts. 2003-2009 results (Overall Period) are also reported for comparison. AMBCU 
and AMBalpha-MEP are the ambiguity indicators under CU and α-MEP based on Eqs. (12-13) and Eqs. (16-17). IV denotes implied volatility. SKEW is the CBOE SKEW index. 
OI denotes open-interest information and SDVIX is the volatility of VIX. 
 
Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
1.OTM 2.ITM 3.OTM 4.ITM 5.OTM 6.ITM 7.OTM 8.ITM 9.OTM 10.ITM 11.OTM 12.ITM 13.OTM 14.ITM 15.OTM 16.ITM 17.OTM 18.ITM
2.255*** 2.490*** 1.547*** 1.960*** 1.876*** 2.173*** 1.579*** 1.643*** 1.432*** 1.583*** 1.210*** 1.246*** 4.780*** 4.759*** 3.651*** 3.960*** 4.351*** 4.554***
(5.736) (6.489) (4.795) (6.156) (5.259) (6.298) (8.741) (9.269) (7.809) (8.508) (7.578) (7.163) (5.276) (5.753) (4.588) (5.321) (5.085) (5.772)
0.677*** 0.721*** 0.572*** 0.589*** 1.324*** 1.322*** 0.258*** 0.253*** 0.265*** 0.261*** 0.734*** 0.741*** 0.560*** 0.529*** 0.468*** 0.454*** 0.973*** 0.895***
(11.646) (13.647) (11.514) (13.118) (11.430) (13.240) (4.685) (4.406) (5.132) (4.494) (7.172) (7.484) (10.797) (11.383) (9.691) (10.043) (10.395) (10.851)
- - 0.276*** 0.278*** - - - - 0.185*** 0.111** - - - - 0.272*** 0.217*** - -
- - (5.369) (5.453) - - - - (4.103) (2.258) - - - - (4.530) (3.779) - -
- - - - 0.457*** 0.574*** - - - - 0.236*** 0.291*** - - - - 0.598*** 0.412***
- - - - (7.224) (5.776) - - - - (8.195) (6.844) - - - - (3.954) (2.625)
-0.125*** -0.154*** -0.099*** -0.151*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.268*** -0.302*** -0.250*** -0.310*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.228*** -0.238*** -0.187*** -0.216*** -0.028*** -0.030***
(-3.655) (-4.611) (-3.397) (-5.127) (-3.810) (-5.188) (-3.526) (-4.021) (-3.399) (-4.155) (-3.275) (-3.843) (-3.696) (-4.261) (-3.382) (-4.140) (-3.847) (-4.416)
0.139 0.139*** 0.100 0.106*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.018 0.123*** 0.002 0.119** 0.000 0.000*** 0.067 0.250*** 0.028 0.201*** 0.000 0.000***
(1.634) (3.069) (1.188) (2.604) (1.549) (3.034) (-0.362) (2.752) (0.045) (2.519) (1.255) (3.159) (0.769) (5.592) (0.323) (4.019) (0.592) (4.733)
-0.017 0.009 -0.071 -0.032 -0.062 -0.024 -0.047 -0.019 -0.071 -0.022 -0.043 -0.022 -0.239*** -0.193*** -0.264*** -0.206*** -0.343*** -0.276***
(-0.350) (0.214) (-1.366) (-0.684) (-0.992) (-0.417) (-0.620) (-0.255) (-0.966) (-0.301) (-1.425) (-0.751) (-3.697) (-3.423) (-3.896) (-3.338) (-3.921) (-3.548)
Adj R
2 64.34% 65.26% 69.22% 70.48% 66.93% 68.13% 21.16% 22.85% 24.41% 23.98% 37.22% 35.44% 54.61% 61.18% 60.20% 64.72% 56.60% 62.16%
F 718.618 748.319 716.499 760.722 644.895 681.303 68.505 75.471 65.974 64.477 120.300 111.436 176.680 231.127 177.638 215.258 153.310 192.879
2.126*** 2.329*** 2.682*** 2.631*** 1.655*** 1.478*** 1.209*** 1.478*** 1.370*** 1.554*** 1.068*** 1.097*** 4.140*** 5.047*** 4.149*** 5.156*** 3.468*** 3.423***
(5.705) (5.869) (6.709) (6.673) (5.236) (4.541) (6.248) (7.013) (7.123) (7.710) (5.890) (5.999) (4.432) (5.395) (4.649) (5.920) (4.073) (4.121)
0.689*** 0.678*** 0.586*** 0.589*** 0.989*** 1.185*** 0.409*** 0.250*** 0.399*** 0.259*** 0.851*** 0.719*** 0.534*** 0.550*** 0.427*** 0.470*** 0.713*** 0.832***
(10.899) (11.586) (10.451) (13.059) (8.618) (10.948) (5.862) (4.540) (5.521) (4.687) (6.252) (4.780) (8.844) (10.407) (6.875) (9.401) (6.641) (8.566)
- - -0.229*** -0.264*** - - - - -0.139*** -0.248*** - - - - -0.276*** -0.292*** - -
- - (-4.258) (-5.113) - - - - (-2.634) (-4.516) - - - - (-4.514) (-4.676) - -
- - - - 0.516*** 0.716*** - - - - 0.156*** 0.280*** - - - - 0.579*** 1.110***
- - - - (7.446) (7.047) - - - - (5.673) (7.273) - - - - (4.814) (5.985)
-0.121*** -0.133*** -0.118*** -0.113*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.160** -0.238*** -0.176** -0.215*** -0.002 -0.003** -0.188*** -0.249*** -0.145** -0.218*** -0.019*** -0.023***
(-3.788) (-3.833) (-4.027) (-3.689) (-2.974) (-3.187) (-2.069) (-2.897) (-2.393) (-2.642) (-1.592) (-2.317) (-3.009) (-3.897) (-2.471) (-3.816) (-2.750) (-3.360)
0.176*** 0.133 0.174*** 0.107 0.000*** 0.000 0.118*** -0.158** 0.114*** -0.168*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.167** 0.051 0.199*** 0.032 0.000 0.000 
(3.571) (1.541) (3.631) (1.275) (2.875) (1.260) (3.225) (-2.462) (3.035) (-2.611) (2.434) (-3.005) (2.214) (0.530) (2.702) (0.355) (1.540) (0.255)
-0.013 -0.031 -0.071 -0.094* -0.139** -0.109* -0.061 -0.039 -0.069 -0.062 -0.040 -0.038 -0.238*** -0.241*** -0.311*** -0.300*** -0.388*** -0.374***
(-0.290) (-0.675) (-1.494) (-1.950) (-2.324) (-1.816) (-0.808) (-0.549) (-0.968) (-0.908) (-1.469) (-1.426) (-3.767) (-3.747) (-4.713) (-4.390) (-4.815) (-4.405)
Adj R2 65.62% 64.32% 69.00% 69.16% 71.29% 68.62% 27.76% 21.61% 29.58% 27.66% 37.40% 37.63% 55.30% 53.41% 61.02% 60.59% 59.33% 58.34%


























Table 5 Panel A - The effect of ambiguity on credit risk under CU  
The table summarizes our daily CR regression results based on Eq. (19). This model is compared to the multivariate structure without the AMB term. We contrast 2003-2006 
results (Stable Period) vs. results from 2007-2009 (Uncertain Period) for calls and puts. 2003-2009 results (Overall Period) are also reported for comparison. AMBCU is the 
elicited Choquet ambiguity indicator based on Eqs. (12-13). IV denotes implied volatility. SKEW is the CBOE SKEW index. OI denotes open-interest information and SDVIX 
is the volatility of VIX. 
 
Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
 
1.OTM 2.ITM 3.OTM 4.ITM 5.OTM 6.ITM 7.OTM 8.ITM 9.OTM 10.ITM 11.OTM 12.ITM
0.228 0.312 0.068 0.150 0.262*** 0.263** 0.173* 0.227** 0.117 0.566 -0.341 -0.010 
(0.783) (1.054) (0.235) (0.520) (2.586) (2.564) (1.886) (2.235) (0.150) (0.767) (-0.415) (-0.013)
0.350*** 0.430*** 0.305** 0.355*** 0.241** 0.256** 0.249** 0.265*** 0.325*** 0.373*** 0.270** 0.295***
(3.085) (3.950) (2.553) (3.028) (2.291) (2.566) (2.392) (2.577) (3.178) (3.650) (2.473) (2.753)
- - 0.116* 0.159*** - - 0.204*** 0.119** - - 0.161** 0.228***
- - (1.873) (2.603) - - (2.739) (2.073) - - (1.980) (2.873)
-0.071* -0.087** -0.060 -0.085** -0.192*** -0.189** -0.172** -0.198*** -0.058 -0.103 -0.034 -0.081 
(-1.686) (-1.989) (-1.469) (-2.049) (-2.674) (-2.519) (-2.553) (-2.603) (-0.794) (-1.486) (-0.464) (-1.187)
0.171 0.013 0.154 -0.006 0.062 0.015 0.084 0.011 0.182 0.007 0.159 -0.045 
(1.307) (0.311) (1.160) (-0.148) (1.120) (0.316) (1.531) (0.233) (1.588) (0.107) (1.379) (-0.718)
0.317*** 0.325*** 0.294*** 0.301*** -0.056 -0.053 -0.082** -0.056 0.434*** 0.432*** 0.419*** 0.419***
(2.847) (2.994) (2.679) (2.889) (-1.460) (-1.406) (-2.077) (-1.492) (3.587) (3.543) (3.572) (3.701)
Adj R
2 43.16% 40.85% 43.99% 42.53% 14.89% 15.08% 18.84% 16.39% 38.70% 35.36% 40.58% 39.25%
F 303.008 275.745 250.960 236.457 44.998 45.653 47.714 40.441 93.182 80.852 80.761 76.448
0.119 0.211 0.389 0.295 0.014 0.177** 0.128 0.214*** -0.112 0.146 -0.107 0.186 
(0.393) (0.727) (1.340) (1.039) (0.153) (2.112) (1.295) (2.658) (-0.137) (0.189) (-0.136) (0.253)
0.464*** 0.387*** 0.370*** 0.341*** 0.425*** 0.272*** 0.412*** 0.280*** 0.420*** 0.355*** 0.334*** 0.312***
(3.882) (3.275) (3.091) (2.820) (3.589) (2.692) (3.467) (2.732) (3.860) (3.439) (3.176) (2.971)
- - -0.208*** -0.137** - - -0.179*** -0.218*** - - -0.222*** -0.161**
- - (-3.056) (-2.289) - - (-3.825) (-3.968) - - (-3.310) (-2.174)
-0.058 -0.069* -0.055 -0.058 -0.043 -0.156*** -0.064 -0.135** -0.040 -0.064 -0.005 -0.046 
(-1.318) (-1.666) (-1.380) (-1.478) (-0.728) (-2.726) (-1.046) (-2.563) (-0.522) (-0.879) (-0.067) (-0.655)
0.062 0.132 0.060 0.119 0.029 0.103* 0.024 0.094 0.094 0.146 0.120 0.136 
(1.088) (1.118) (1.092) (1.012) (0.826) (1.686) (0.683) (1.504) (1.035) (1.446) (1.397) (1.375)
0.306*** 0.302*** 0.254*** 0.269** -0.090** -0.068* -0.101** -0.088** 0.430*** 0.429*** 0.371*** 0.396***
(2.885) (2.742) (2.676) (2.487) (-2.204) (-1.824) (-2.532) (-2.479) (3.683) (3.599) (3.435) (3.370)
Adj R
2 44.81% 43.87% 47.59% 45.15% 21.34% 16.77% 24.43% 21.41% 40.78% 39.60% 44.45% 41.68%


















Stable Period Uncertain Period




Table 5 Panel B - The effect of ambiguity on credit risk under α-MEP and EUUP  
The table summarizes our daily CR regression results based on Eq. (19). This model is compared to the multivariate structure without the AMB term. We contrast 2003-2006 
results (Stable Period) vs. results from 2007-2009 (Uncertain Period) for calls and puts. 2003-2009 results (Overall Period) are also reported for comparison. AMBalpha-MEP 
and AMBBIIYF are the ambiguity indicators under α-MEP and EUUP based on Eqs. (16-17) and Eq. (6). IV denotes implied volatility. SKEW is the CBOE SKEW index. OI 
denotes open-interest information and SDVIX is the volatility of VIX. 
 
Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
1.OTM 2.ITM 3.OTM 4.ITM 5.OTM 6.ITM 7.OTM 8.ITM 9.OTM 10.ITM 11.OTM 12.ITM
0.162 0.223 1.123*** 1.136*** 0.151* 0.119 0.181** 0.176** -0.050 0.411 1.522*** 1.790***
(0.568) (0.755) (4.790) (4.429) (1.682) (1.234) (2.401) (2.241) (-0.065) (0.559) (2.662) (3.062)
0.370*** 0.425*** -0.015 0.131 0.328*** 0.349*** 0.133 0.137** 0.387*** 0.423*** -0.169* -0.043 
(3.033) (3.864) (-0.165) (1.473) (2.831) (3.002) (1.508) (1.990) (3.050) (3.482) (-1.950) (-0.476)
0.080** 0.162*** - - 0.071*** 0.105*** - - 0.232** 0.313*** - -
(2.563) (4.060) - - (3.637) (2.745) - - (2.483) (3.524) - -
- - 0.131*** 0.122*** - - -0.045*** -0.045*** - - 0.158*** 0.149***
- - (5.060) (4.522) - - (-5.624) (-4.967) - - (6.190) (5.334)
-0.004* -0.005** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009* -0.015*** -0.017***
(-1.682) (-2.153) (-5.353) (-5.020) (-2.431) (-2.294) (-1.536) (-1.370) (-0.854) (-1.667) (-3.096) (-3.547)
0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
(1.289) (0.150) (2.755) (0.163) (1.878) (0.405) (2.079) (1.680) (1.516) (-0.265) (3.497) (0.974)
0.215*** 0.218*** 0.165*** 0.180*** -0.020** -0.017** -0.019** -0.016** 0.400*** 0.397*** 0.224*** 0.253***
(2.735) (2.884) (3.843) (4.128) (-2.206) (-1.968) (-2.229) (-1.981) (3.554) (3.532) (3.792) (4.141)
Adj R
2 43.40% 41.62% 61.66% 57.60% 19.69% 20.50% 23.15% 23.27% 39.26% 36.53% 63.52% 57.97%
F 244.977 227.858 512.775 433.227 50.341 52.888 61.603 62.017 76.489 68.226 204.380 162.098
-0.243 0.129 0.941*** 1.066*** -0.004 0.114 0.031 0.175** -0.970 -0.395 0.936 1.338**
(-0.639) (0.547) (3.479) (4.534) (-0.047) (1.487) (0.357) (2.091) (-0.991) (-0.486) (1.346) (2.267)
0.510*** 0.395*** 0.156 -0.002 0.487*** 0.397*** 0.326** 0.165 0.458*** 0.386*** 0.000 -0.133 
(3.424) (3.786) (1.620) (-0.018) (3.558) (2.737) (2.415) (1.196) (3.088) (2.971) (0.004) (-1.440)
0.106** 0.069 - - 0.019 0.046 - - 0.249** 0.370** - -
(2.274) (1.434) - - (0.917) (1.169) - - (2.335) (2.439) - -
- - 0.116*** 0.130*** - - -0.035*** -0.041*** - - 0.145*** 0.155***
- - (4.371) (5.005) - - (-4.266) (-5.188) - - (5.437) (5.916)
0.001 -0.003* -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001 0.007 -0.003 -0.011* -0.013***
(0.405) (-1.824) (-4.217) (-5.088) (-0.603) (-2.513) (-0.121) (-1.610) (0.848) (-0.498) (-1.874) (-2.705)
0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000***
(0.613) (1.298) (1.833) (2.721) (0.737) (1.629) (2.080) (1.973) (0.593) (1.317) (2.416) (3.391)
- 0.205*** 0.171*** 0.157*** -0.022** -0.019** -0.021** -0.021** - 0.387*** 0.242*** 0.225***
- (3.286) (3.939) (3.678) (-2.386) (-2.156) (-2.399) (-2.430) - (3.552) (4.112) (3.877)
Adj R2 37.95% 43.97% 59.48% 61.74% 21.77% 18.15% 25.46% 23.20% 25.05% 40.68% 60.96% 63.02%






















Overall Period Stable Period Uncertain Period
Credit Risk (CR) Credit Risk (CR) Credit Risk (CR)
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Table 6 - Monthly effect of ambiguity on systemic banking risk under CU  
The table summarizes our 2003-2009 monthly regression results based on Eq. (19). This model is compared to the multivariate structure without the AMB term. DR stands for 
systemic banks’ downside risk, EBETA is systemic banks’ market beta risk, and CR is systemic banks’ credit risk. AMBCU and AMBCUSUMDEV are the elicited ambiguity indicators 
under CU based on Eqs. (12-14). IV denotes implied volatility. SKEW is the CBOE SKEW index. OI denotes open-interest information and SDVIX is the volatility of VIX. 
 
t-statistics in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
1.OTM 2.ITM 3.OTM 4.ITM 5.OTM 6.ITM 7.OTM 8.ITM 9.OTM 10.ITM 11.OTM 12.ITM 13.OTM 14.ITM 15.OTM 16.ITM 17.OTM 18.ITM
0.119 0.209 -0.115 0.053 -0.042 0.106 2.830*** 2.806*** 2.357*** 2.490*** 2.564*** 2.661*** -0.195 0.076 -0.441 -0.090 -0.356 -0.025 
(0.197) (0.338) (-0.189) (0.087) (-0.073) (0.179) (3.676) (3.627) (3.153) (3.388) (3.703) (3.648) (-0.305) (0.110) (-0.684) (-0.130) (-0.584) (-0.037)
1.212*** 1.131*** 1.141*** 1.072*** 1.050*** 0.955*** 1.089*** 0.983*** 0.946*** 0.863*** 0.820*** 0.735*** 0.366*** 0.472*** 0.291** 0.409*** 0.203 0.298**
(9.512) (9.302) (8.682) (8.673) (8.013) (7.200) (6.697) (6.458) (5.852) (5.825) (5.162) (4.493) (2.707) (3.455) (2.090) (2.937) (1.451) (1.977)
- - 0.311* 0.380* - - - - 0.628*** 0.772*** - - - - 0.327* 0.406* - -
- - (1.794) (1.860) - - - - (2.946) (3.151) - - - - (1.776) (1.764) - -
- - - - 0.479*** 0.435*** - - - - 0.793*** 0.613*** - - - - 0.479*** 0.429**
- - - - (3.108) (2.755) - - - - (4.242) (3.148) - - - - (2.911) (2.385)
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 -0.016** -0.016** -0.015** -0.017*** -0.014** -0.015** 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 
(-0.289) (-0.436) (-0.157) (-0.508) (-0.007) (-0.306) (-2.479) (-2.448) (-2.382) (-2.709) (-2.348) (-2.426) (0.030) (-0.438) (0.165) (-0.506) (0.311) (-0.322)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
(0.264) (0.474) (0.141) (0.167) (0.697) (0.149) (-0.856) (0.685) (-1.108) (0.194) (-0.374) (0.330) (3.986) (1.247) (3.913) (0.956) (4.551) (0.982)
-0.000 -0.012 -0.016 -0.020 -0.070 -0.041 -0.107 -0.130 -0.139 -0.147* -0.222*** -0.171** 0.168** 0.218*** 0.152** 0.209*** 0.099 0.189**
(-0.007) (-0.165) (-0.233) (-0.282) (-0.998) (-0.586) (-1.185) (-1.440) (-1.610) (-1.722) (-2.607) (-1.987) (2.253) (2.688) (2.046) (2.615) (1.319) (2.388)
0.193*** 0.198*** 0.169** 0.155** 0.137** 0.141** 0.413*** 0.409*** 0.364*** 0.321*** 0.320*** 0.328*** -0.019 0.000 -0.045 -0.046 -0.076 -0.056 
(2.969) (2.956) (2.573) (2.221) (2.138) (2.098) (4.981) (4.865) (4.516) (3.832) (4.128) (3.953) (-0.279) (0.005) (-0.649) (-0.580) (-1.107) (-0.727)
Adj R2 76.92% 75.42% 77.64% 76.27% 79.49% 77.57% 73.02% 72.32% 75.72% 75.49% 78.35% 75.49% 45.47% 34.77% 47.12% 36.71% 50.80% 38.92%
F 50.316 46.421 43.815 40.641 25.098 21.735 41.057 39.669 39.469 38.989 10.666 6.001 13.343 8.888 11.992 8.153 20.159 12.044
-0.129 0.171 0.401 0.461 -0.238 0.074 2.623*** 2.977*** 3.526*** 3.431*** 2.418*** 2.823*** -0.362 -0.289 0.031 0.019 -0.434 -0.391 
(-0.222) (0.288) (0.691) (0.775) (-0.433) (0.130) (3.289) (3.789) (4.582) (4.398) (3.409) (3.827) (-0.552) (-0.458) (0.046) (0.030) (-0.670) (-0.644)
1.127*** 1.297*** 1.029*** 1.155*** 0.998*** 1.115*** 0.887*** 1.112*** 0.720*** 0.891*** 0.645*** 0.824*** 0.571*** 0.428*** 0.499*** 0.278* 0.486*** 0.237 
(10.364) (9.831) (9.480) (7.920) (8.973) (7.759) (5.943) (6.356) (5.006) (4.662) (4.497) (4.422) (4.656) (3.047) (3.933) (1.791) (3.710) (1.545)
- - -0.634*** -0.446** - - - - -1.080*** -0.698** - - - - -0.470* -0.473** - -
- - (-2.922) (-2.065) - - - - (-3.757) (-2.467) - - - - (-1.856) (-2.055) - -
- - - - 0.446*** 0.399*** - - - - 0.836*** 0.633*** - - - - 0.295* 0.421***
- - - - (3.046) (2.658) - - - - (4.424) (3.253) - - - - (1.706) (2.626)
0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.015** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.013** -0.017*** 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 
(0.076) (-0.471) (-0.215) (-0.524) (0.294) (-0.342) (-2.159) (-2.672) (-2.722) (-2.819) (-2.115) (-2.666) (0.175) (0.175) (-0.010) (0.137) (0.297) (0.329)
0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000***
(1.225) (-0.857) (1.396) (-0.709) (1.324) (-0.772) (1.322) (-1.563) (1.580) (-1.418) (1.531) (-1.519) (1.715) (3.530) (1.812) (3.764) (1.754) (3.793)
-0.027 -0.006 -0.053 -0.035 -0.085 -0.032 -0.141 -0.108 -0.185** -0.154* -0.248*** -0.150* 0.195*** 0.163** 0.176** 0.132* 0.157** 0.135*
(-0.409) (-0.088) (-0.833) (-0.508) (-1.287) (-0.480) (-1.540) (-1.173) (-2.186) (-1.692) (-2.928) (-1.716) (2.594) (2.204) (2.356) (1.789) (2.032) (1.886)
0.172*** 0.168** 0.124** 0.138** 0.122** 0.119* 0.405*** 0.412*** 0.324*** 0.366*** 0.312*** 0.334*** -0.053 -0.057 -0.088 -0.088 -0.086 -0.109 
(2.744) (2.561) (2.018) (2.113) (1.991) (1.812) (4.708) (4.739) (3.965) (4.262) (3.940) (3.934) (-0.748) (-0.813) (-1.223) (-1.256) (-1.183) (-1.554)
Adj R2 78.92% 77.73% 81.00% 78.74% 81.18% 79.53% 71.49% 71.87% 76.05% 73.80% 77.54% 75.30% 43.57% 46.84% 45.50% 49.21% 45.09% 51.02%

























Downside Risk (DR) Systematic Risk (EBETA) Credit Risk (CR)
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Table 7 – Variance decomposition of downside risk under low and high uncertainty  
The table summarizes results from our FEVD models described in Eqs. (20-21) and compares the relative effect of 
ambiguity AMB on Eq. (19)’s variables for calls and puts over 2003-2009. Each entry in the table reports the percentage 
of forecast error variance of variables on the left-hand side explained by variables at the top before (StablePeriod) and 
during the crisis (UncertainPeriod). Entries are all convergent values in a 250-day horizon. DR represents banking 
downside risk. EBETA represents systematic market risk. CR represents credit risk. AMBPCA is the first principal 
component of AMBCU, AMBalpha-MEP and AMBBIIYF. IV denotes implied market volatility. SKEW is the CBOE SKEW 
index. OI denotes open-interest information and SDVIX is the volatility of VIX. 
 
 
 PANEL A: Downside Risk (DR)
CALLS (StablePeriod) DR IV AMB PCA SKEW OI SDVIX PUTS (StablePeriod) DR IV AMB PCA SKEW OI SDVIX
DR 89.959 1.438 3.455 0.588 0.579 3.981 DR 89.749 2.623 1.424 2.375 0.013 3.816
IV 5.217 93.762 0.025 0.388 0.526 0.084 IV 12.756 75.204 1.778 10.127 0.052 0.082
AMBPCA 23.506 8.264 49.271 5.453 11.230 2.276 AMBPCA 23.616 15.259 59.091 0.398 0.280 1.357
SKEW 0.164 0.224 10.896 42.065 44.539 2.113 SKEW 5.122 17.371 22.058 27.935 13.470 14.044
OI 2.213 0.046 1.325 17.944 78.110 0.363 OI 0.049 0.025 2.384 2.049 95.339 0.155
SDVIX 0.143 0.645 0.391 0.208 1.476 97.138 SDVIX 0.069 1.904 0.810 2.240 0.421 94.556
CALLS (UncertainPeriod) DR IV AMB PCA SKEW OI SDVIX PUTS (UncertainPeriod) DR IV AMB PCA SKEW OI SDVIX
DR 78.689 9.951 10.176 0.009 1.148 0.027 DR 87.245 6.292 6.366 0.002 0.089 0.007
IV 6.147 83.952 8.559 0.018 0.034 1.289 IV 6.836 90.005 1.556 0.359 0.575 0.668
AMBPCA 4.966 45.846 16.694 7.484 1.645 23.365 AMBPCA 36.252 11.310 30.645 2.877 2.766 16.150
SKEW 0.241 0.015 0.010 92.502 0.996 6.237 SKEW 0.436 0.036 0.063 92.012 0.706 6.747
OI 22.983 2.074 1.363 0.106 73.463 0.011 OI 17.725 8.171 0.033 0.084 73.854 0.132
SDVIX 0.956 9.248 16.678 0.622 0.105 72.391 SDVIX 3.539 6.611 33.560 0.304 0.407 55.579
PANEL B: Systematic Risk (EBETA)
CALLS (StablePeriod) EBETA IV AMB PCA SKEW OI SDVIX PUTS (StablePeriod) EBETA IV AMB PCA SKEW OI SDVIX
EBETA 84.545 0.023 2.423 7.830 4.213 0.966 EBETA 88.353 0.665 0.006 10.097 0.054 0.825
IV 0.438 98.567 0.463 0.283 0.232 0.016 IV 0.980 86.542 1.345 10.989 0.064 0.080
AMBPCA 2.186 14.226 67.569 7.828 5.554 2.636 AMBPCA 12.987 15.895 61.881 7.688 0.077 1.474
SKEW 4.582 0.107 10.288 29.738 52.128 3.157 SKEW 16.803 23.792 8.513 38.075 0.187 12.631
OI 0.882 0.239 0.027 8.021 90.570 0.260 OI 1.540 0.646 0.430 7.677 89.580 0.127
SDVIX 0.650 1.060 0.069 0.293 1.274 96.654 SDVIX 0.237 3.400 0.054 2.362 0.168 93.779
CALLS (UncertainPeriod) EBETA IV AMB PCA SKEW OI SDVIX PUTS (UncertainPeriod) EBETA IV AMB PCA SKEW OI SDVIX
EBETA 61.130 20.994 15.181 0.778 0.196 1.721 EBETA 61.170 26.273 11.096 0.997 0.005 0.460
IV 0.044 84.677 12.098 0.754 0.464 1.963 IV 0.009 92.508 4.265 0.013 0.013 3.191
AMBPCA 11.556 49.326 13.794 10.892 0.334 14.098 AMBPCA 13.799 41.561 13.405 14.260 0.041 16.935
SKEW 0.612 0.996 1.655 87.456 1.353 7.928 SKEW 0.472 1.078 2.054 87.422 1.008 7.965
OI 0.009 1.191 1.108 0.056 97.633 0.003 OI 0.003 5.110 0.064 0.111 94.673 0.038
SDVIX 1.519 9.784 16.855 0.007 0.015 71.819 SDVIX 1.307 6.423 22.392 0.043 0.070 69.765
PANEL C: Credit Risk (CR)
CALLS (StablePeriod) CR IV AMB PCA SKEW OI SDVIX PUTS (StablePeriod) CR IV AMB PCA SKEW OI SDVIX
CR 99.945 0.001 0.023 0.014 0.004 0.014 CR 99.601 0.221 0.003 0.147 0.002 0.026
IV 0.434 98.236 0.176 0.279 0.828 0.047 IV 1.368 88.938 3.652 6.002 0.019 0.021
AMBPCA 0.004 12.343 57.962 5.042 22.105 2.544 AMBPCA 0.077 23.627 74.151 0.142 0.094 1.909
SKEW 0.060 0.152 9.067 53.498 35.591 1.632 SKEW 0.324 2.790 44.735 22.443 18.854 10.855
OI 0.015 0.034 6.290 17.598 75.770 0.292 OI 0.110 0.004 1.755 0.806 97.099 0.225
SDVIX 0.119 0.969 0.031 0.005 1.037 97.839 SDVIX 0.097 2.158 0.815 2.310 0.569 94.051
CALLS (UncertainPeriod) CR IV AMB PCA SKEW OI SDVIX PUTS (UncertainPeriod) CR IV AMB PCA SKEW OI SDVIX
CR 90.747 4.673 4.005 0.099 0.094 0.383 CR 91.107 3.388 5.037 0.059 0.004 0.405
IV 0.212 88.720 7.943 0.016 0.262 2.848 IV 2.196 95.781 0.058 0.377 0.102 1.485
AMBPCA 24.132 33.572 36.423 1.558 0.040 4.274 AMBPCA 35.911 21.054 30.555 7.453 2.029 2.997
SKEW 1.404 0.251 0.281 90.278 0.937 6.850 SKEW 1.356 0.200 0.125 90.758 0.870 6.691
OI 8.684 0.035 0.563 0.254 90.395 0.069 OI 7.339 1.805 0.213 0.184 90.458 0.001
SDVIX 3.885 10.369 18.824 0.433 0.001 66.487 SDVIX 4.847 7.855 27.213 0.652 0.000 59.432
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Table 8 Panel A - Ambiguity and economic activity under CU 
The table summarizes our lagged univariate regressions on the effect of ambiguity AMBCU on economic activity over 2003-2009. CUG stands for capacity utilization growth 
(production). TNPG denotes total non-farm payroll growth (employment) and CFNAI is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (economic performance). 
 
Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
Table 8 Panel B - Ambiguity and economic activity under α-MEP and EUUP 
The table summarizes our lagged univariate regressions on the effect of ambiguity (AMBalpha-MEP and AMBBIIYF) on economic activity over 2003-2009. CUG stands for capacity 
utilization growth (production). TNPG denotes total non-farm payroll growth (employment) and CFNAI is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (economic performance). 
 







































14.40** 16.64*** -18.51*** -15.09*** 3.98*** 4.98*** 4.93*** 5.49*** -5.35*** -4.31*** 1.88*** 2.38*** 2.32*** 2.51*** -3.22*** -2.66*** 0.50*** 0.70***
(2.46) (2.59) (-3.55) (-2.80) (3.33) (3.30) (2.94) (2.66) (-3.39) (-2.70) (4.92) (5.67) (3.00) (2.67) (-4.23) (-3.47) (3.19) (3.77)
-25.21** -28.84** 35.94*** 32.21*** -24.22*** -23.87*** -7.39** -8.30** 11.89*** 10.87*** -7.11*** -7.76*** -4.28*** -4.60*** 5.98*** 5.39*** -3.92*** -4.01***
(-2.40) (-2.53) (3.72) (2.93) (-3.87) (-3.47) (-2.39) (-2.29) (4.20) (3.35) (-3.38) (-3.83) (-3.02) (-2.77) (4.35) (3.45) (-4.25) (-4.40)
Adj R2 13.15% 13.15% 13.55% 17.23% 18.49% 20.90% 23.11% 22.24% 30.70% 40.23% 32.19% 44.76% 32.51% 28.53% 32.04% 40.65% 40.54% 49.46%
F 12.06 12.05 12.44 16.20 17.56 20.29 22.94 21.88 33.34 50.13 35.66 60.15 36.16 30.14 35.41 50.99 50.78 72.44













































15.23** 16.95* 7.09*** 18.37*** 14.02*** 23.76** 1.82 5.31*** 5.36** 3.07*** 7.10*** 5.55*** 8.41*** 1.45*** 1.98** 2.33** 1.05*** 3.04*** 2.28*** 3.77*** 0.19 
(2.29) (1.77) (3.31) (2.72) (2.14) (1.55) (1.01) (3.25) (1.99) (7.60) (5.49) (7.60) (5.49) (5.16) (2.57) (2.04) (5.55) (4.79) (7.60) (5.49) (1.24)
-19.69** -21.99* -18.25*** -26.13*** -23.63*** -31.53*** -3.36** -5.99*** -6.07* -5.93*** -8.97*** -8.03*** -10.16*** -1.18*** -2.82*** -3.24** -3.04*** -4.50*** -4.06*** -5.18*** -0.58***
(-2.33) (-1.83) (-3.33) (-2.75) (-2.90) (-2.59) (-2.46) (-2.90) (-1.86) (-6.03) (-4.92) (-5.23) (-3.88) (-5.74) (-2.81) (-2.29) (-6.33) (-4.95) (-5.49) (-4.17) (-5.08)
Adj R2 4.49% 4.04% 22.27% 12.69% 3.12% -6.46% 11.39% 9.24% 6.72% 47.53% 31.14% 47.53% 31.14% 29.67% 8.30% 8.14% 51.62% 32.29% 47.53% 31.14% 29.78%
F 4.48 4.07 21.92 11.61 1.31 -8.99 10.39 8.43 6.26 67.12 34.02 67.12 34.02 31.79 7.61 7.47 78.88 35.82 67.12 34.02 31.96





Table 8 Panel C - Systemic banking risk and economic activity under CU 
The table summarizes our lagged univariate regressions on the effect of systemic banking risk (SBR) on economic activity over 2003-2009. CUG stands for capacity utilization 
growth (production). TNPG denotes total non-farm payroll growth (employment) and CFNAI is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (economic performance). Raw SBR 
are direct and raw measures of systemic risk. SBRCUcall, SBRCUput and SBRCUSUMDEV are predicted systemic banking risk measures based on Eq. (19) under CU. DR, EBETA 
and CR are as defined before. 
 











































4.90*** 4.49*** 4.50*** 4.89*** 4.50*** 4.82*** 4.56*** 2.19*** 2.49*** 2.52*** 2.53*** 2.52*** 2.48*** 2.51*** 0.58*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.69***
(4.88) (3.93) (3.82) (4.76) (3.82) (4.43) (4.13) (9.10) (12.66) (13.59) (15.48) (13.59) (12.34) (14.38) (6.90) (6.09) (6.13) (8.77) (6.13) (7.27) (7.23)
-18.03*** -17.17*** -17.19*** -18.35*** -17.19*** -18.17*** -17.36*** -5.38*** -6.33*** -6.40*** -6.47*** -6.40*** -6.33*** -6.39*** -2.72*** -3.05*** -3.06*** -3.08*** -3.06*** -3.09*** -3.07***
(-8.11) (-5.27) (-5.33) (-6.76) (-5.33) (-6.33) (-5.78) (-7.51) (-11.73) (-12.44) (-19.00) (-12.44) (-13.07) (-13.80) (-11.92) (-8.27) (-8.78) (-15.03) (-8.78) (-11.27) (-10.39)
Adj R2 43.66% 27.35% 27.13% 32.67% 27.13% 31.07% 28.25% 77.41% 75.27% 76.17% 81.55% 76.17% 75.87% 77.30% 81.44% 71.91% 71.62% 76.09% 71.62% 74.31% 73.22%
F 57.58 28.48 28.18 36.43 28.18 33.90 29.74 251.22 223.14 234.35 323.70 234.35 230.51 249.52 321.30 187.86 185.22 233.35 185.22 212.11 200.56
13.14*** 16.36*** 16.68*** 18.30*** 16.68*** 17.67*** 17.11*** 4.85*** 6.97*** 6.92*** 7.24*** 6.92*** 6.88*** 7.09*** 1.89*** 2.84*** 2.80*** 2.91*** 2.80*** 2.84*** 2.87***
(4.84) (4.62) (4.47) (5.22) (4.47) (5.31) (4.80) (4.93) (9.13) (9.01) (9.05) (9.01) (8.07) (10.06) (5.93) (7.90) (7.67) (8.30) (7.67) (7.94) (8.65)
-11.75*** -14.27*** -14.52*** -15.83*** -14.52*** -15.33*** -14.87*** -3.67*** -5.34*** -5.30*** -5.56*** -5.30*** -5.28*** -5.43*** -1.83*** -2.58*** -2.55*** -2.63*** -2.55*** -2.58*** -2.60***
(-5.02) (-4.71) (-4.60) (-5.40) (-4.60) (-5.56) (-4.95) (-4.10) (-7.92) (-7.90) (-7.98) (-7.90) (-7.17) (-8.93) (-6.18) (-8.09) (-8.03) (-8.71) (-8.03) (-8.39) (-9.06)
Adj R2 22.83% 24.17% 25.81% 30.27% 25.81% 28.87% 26.93% 44.94% 68.86% 69.65% 75.26% 69.65% 68.97% 72.83% 45.79% 65.95% 66.10% 69.27% 66.10% 67.93% 68.60%
F 22.60 24.27 26.40 32.70 26.40 30.63 27.90 60.59 162.41 168.54 223.03 168.54 163.22 196.65 62.66 142.37 143.31 165.54 143.31 155.62 160.46
1.24 2.16** 2.15** 2.51*** 2.15** 2.33*** 2.18** 1.11*** 1.42*** 1.71*** 1.71*** 1.71*** 1.39*** 1.69*** 0.03 0.22** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.21** 0.31***
(1.28) (2.48) (2.15) (3.01) (2.15) (2.86) (2.27) (3.50) (5.59) (7.73) (8.31) (7.73) (5.56) (7.70) (0.23) (2.22) (3.79) (4.52) (3.79) (2.24) (3.85)
-19.71*** -26.74*** -26.86*** -29.66*** -26.86*** -28.14*** -27.10*** -5.99*** -8.39*** -10.50*** -10.59*** -10.50*** -8.18*** -10.32*** -3.02*** -4.41*** -5.14*** -5.17*** -5.14*** -4.38*** -5.09***
(-5.75) (-3.98) (-3.78) (-5.20) (-3.78) (-4.64) (-3.82) (-8.04) (-4.59) (-5.30) (-7.72) (-5.30) (-4.97) (-5.26) (-8.48) (-6.20) (-6.63) (-9.95) (-6.63) (-6.82) (-6.55)
Adj R2 25.12% 22.63% 17.64% 25.35% 17.64% 26.27% 18.85% 46.64% 45.00% 55.61% 65.48% 55.61% 44.50% 56.21% 48.79% 51.38% 54.89% 64.07% 54.89% 52.62% 56.27%

















Production (CUG) Employment (TNPG)
48 
 
Table S1 – Ambiguity and systemic bank risk under CU and α-MEP 
The table summarizes our daily panel regression results on the effect of ambiguity on systemic bank risks DR and EBETA over 2003-2009. IV is the option implied volatility 
per bank. AMBCU,B and AMBalpha,B are the ambiguity scores per bank under CU and α-MEP. AMBCUSUMDEV and AMBalphaSUM capture the degree of ambiguity in the options market 
per bank under CU and α-MEP. SKEW is the CBOE SKEW index. OI is the option open-interest per bank. SDVIX is the volatility of VIX. Size is the natural logarithm of the 
bank’s market capitalization. The panel regressions are specified with cross-sectional and time fixed-effects.  
 
Cross-sectional dependence robust t-statistics based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998) are reported in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM ITM ITM ITM ITM ITM OTM OTM OTM OTM OTM ITM ITM ITM ITM ITM
-1.457 -1.625 -1.684 -1.642 -1.594 1.021 0.667 0.659 0.704 0.659 -0.355 -0.678 -1.024 -0.974 -0.968 2.183* 1.616 1.275 1.498 1.085
(-1.276) (-1.406) (-1.437) (-1.447) (-1.400) (0.820) (0.554) (0.527) (0.594) (0.559) (-0.380) (-0.754) (-1.212) (-1.145) (-1.140) (1.883) (1.564) (1.209) (1.472) (1.094)
1.423*** 1.405*** 1.379*** 1.430*** 1.405*** 1.078*** 1.059*** 1.035*** 1.109*** 1.078*** 1.555*** 1.520*** 1.427*** 1.581*** 1.477*** 1.184*** 1.154*** 1.076*** 1.250*** 1.183***
(4.181) (4.187) (4.200) (4.251) (4.163) (3.655) (3.719) (3.647) (3.861) (3.735) (4.795) (4.796) (4.650) (5.108) (4.726) (4.161) (4.284) (3.985) (4.746) (4.477)
- 0.171*** - - - - 0.335*** - - - - 0.331*** - - - - 0.537*** - - -
- (2.867) - - - - (3.317) - - - - (4.396) - - - - (4.760) - - -
- - 0.638*** - - - - 0.793*** - - - - 1.888*** - - - - 1.990*** - -
- - (2.687) - - - - (2.948) - - - - (7.208) - - - - (7.010) - -
- - - 0.118*** - - - - 0.268*** - - - - 0.395*** - - - - 0.579*** -
- - - (3.038) - - - - (3.573) - - - - (8.671) - - - - (7.411) -
- - - - 0.115*** - - - - 0.237*** - - - - 0.517*** - - - - 0.719***
- - - - (3.475) - - - - (3.199) - - - - (9.847) - - - - (7.919)
-0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.012** -0.011** -0.011** -0.012** -0.011** -0.007 -0.005 -0.006* -0.006 -0.005 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010**
(-2.219) (-2.156) (-2.229) (-2.186) (-2.160) (-2.340) (-2.361) (-2.330) (-2.368) (-2.306) (-1.602) (-1.375) (-1.678) (-1.445) (-1.214) (-2.741) (-2.811) (-2.786) (-2.805) (-2.494)
0.058 0.054 0.053 0.058 0.055 0.017 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.091** 0.083** 0.077** 0.092** 0.077** 0.089*** 0.078*** 0.068*** 0.076*** 0.074***
(1.562) (1.493) (1.481) (1.578) (1.515) (0.817) (0.530) (0.452) (0.565) (0.608) (2.284) (2.213) (2.260) (2.414) (2.123) (4.013) (4.015) (3.982) (3.949) (3.771)
0.021 0.005 -0.023 0.008 -0.000 0.110 0.080 0.046 0.082 0.083 0.052 0.023 -0.078 0.011 -0.042 0.199** 0.151** 0.039 0.139* 0.118
(0.335) (0.086) (-0.341) (0.136) (-0.002) (1.608) (1.223) (0.661) (1.256) (1.289) (0.666) (0.289) (-1.045) (0.136) (-0.566) (2.487) (1.987) (0.514) (1.877) (1.623)
0.150 0.155 0.166 0.155 0.155 0.010 0.027 0.037 0.024 0.026 0.075 0.085 0.123 0.092 0.101 -0.097 -0.068 -0.028 -0.066 -0.048
(1.337) (1.389) (1.467) (1.398) (1.401) (0.091) (0.259) (0.340) (0.229) (0.249) (0.881) (1.027) (1.563) (1.166) (1.274) (-1.070) (-0.822) (-0.347) (-0.805) (-0.595)
R-squared 32.10% 32.40% 32.80% 32.30% 32.30% 25.90% 26.90% 27.00% 26.80% 26.40% 49.40% 50.90% 56.60% 52.80% 55.00% 42.30% 45.30% 50.20% 47.10% 47.40%
F 19.61 17.67 19.40 20.05 16.55 19.87 17.16 18.15 17.28 16.94 18.22 15.88 19.40 25.83 28.52 15.21 13.85 17.77 18.62 25.21
-2.359** -2.337** -2.457** -2.449** -2.439** -1.603* -1.669* -1.788* -1.877** -1.845** -1.631** -1.532** -2.003*** -2.028*** -2.099*** -0.286 -0.574 -0.923 -1.219 -1.253*
(-2.076) (-2.071) (-2.113) (-2.147) (-2.133) (-1.802) (-1.835) (-1.882) (-2.029) (-1.971) (-2.158) (-2.094) (-2.831) (-2.843) (-2.922) (-0.393) (-0.827) (-1.418) (-1.638) (-1.754)
1.606*** 1.598*** 1.570*** 1.585*** 1.593*** 1.524*** 1.525*** 1.477*** 1.527*** 1.517*** 1.740*** 1.703*** 1.603*** 1.644*** 1.659*** 1.780*** 1.784*** 1.619*** 1.792*** 1.751***
(5.239) (5.267) (5.317) (5.188) (5.214) (5.141) (5.154) (5.250) (5.130) (5.135) (8.093) (8.115) (7.713) (7.701) (7.722) (7.790) (7.995) (7.523) (7.784) (7.667)
- -0.107* - - - - -0.117* - - - - -0.475*** - - - - -0.511*** - - -
- (-1.716) - - - - (-1.669) - - - - (-4.929) - - - - (-5.918) - - -
- - 0.432** - - - - 0.502** - - - - 1.640*** - - - - 1.732*** - -
- - (2.238) - - - - (2.264) - - - - (6.642) - - - - (6.217) - -
- - - 0.074*** - - - - 0.129*** - - - - 0.327*** - - - - 0.439*** -
- - - (4.255) - - - - (4.672) - - - - (9.995) - - - - (10.843) -
- - - - 0.080*** - - - - 0.168*** - - - - 0.469*** - - - - 0.671***
- - - - (3.667) - - - - (3.675) - - - - (10.840) - - - - (10.880)
-0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.005 -0.005* -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005
(-1.726) (-1.733) (-1.727) (-1.622) (-1.653) (-2.349) (-2.315) (-2.371) (-2.197) (-2.292) (-0.971) (-1.031) (-1.004) (-0.463) (-0.534) (-1.524) (-1.391) (-1.626) (-1.065) (-1.293)
0.032 0.031 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.036* 0.035* 0.036* 0.033* 0.035* 0.091*** 0.088*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.034 0.030 0.031 0.023 0.030
(1.353) (1.343) (1.250) (1.225) (1.269) (1.803) (1.743) (1.807) (1.657) (1.777) (3.248) (3.371) (3.547) (3.088) (3.092) (1.410) (1.332) (1.612) (1.003) (1.356)
-0.017 -0.026 -0.046 -0.039 -0.032 -0.025 -0.037 -0.058 -0.039 -0.040 0.016 -0.024 -0.093 -0.079 -0.070 0.007 -0.048 -0.109 -0.042 -0.052
(-0.265) (-0.396) (-0.651) (-0.586) (-0.482) (-0.390) (-0.564) (-0.822) (-0.602) (-0.601) (0.229) (-0.352) (-1.356) (-1.169) (-1.021) (0.089) (-0.676) (-1.545) (-0.587) (-0.716)
0.223** 0.227** 0.232** 0.230** 0.227** 0.181** 0.191** 0.192** 0.195** 0.190** 0.148** 0.166*** 0.181*** 0.178*** 0.170*** 0.122* 0.166*** 0.159*** 0.169*** 0.156**
(2.233) (2.251) (2.266) (2.298) (2.266) (2.002) (2.048) (2.054) (2.121) (2.067) (2.211) (2.595) (2.875) (2.753) (2.610) (1.930) (2.701) (2.647) (2.596) (2.437)
R-squared 35.90% 35.90% 36.20% 36.10% 36.00% 33.90% 34.10% 34.40% 34.20% 34.20% 56.10% 57.90% 61.30% 60.50% 60.60% 53.80% 57.00% 59.70% 57.30% 58.30%
F 26.90 22.74 22.01 26.56 23.73 27.48 25.81 24.19 23.09 24.32 18.65 17.78 20.11 31.47 33.51 21.78 19.82 21.06 25.88 27.41





























Table S2 – Ambiguity and systemic banking risk (1999-2015) 
The table summarizes our regression results on the effect of ambiguity on systemic banking risk DR, DBETA (downside beta used herein to partly mitigate endogeneity and 
multicollinearity issues associated with the AMBBI-EBETA relationship) and CR over 1999-2015. IV is the implied volatility of the IYF options, AMBBISPX is the ambiguity 
indicator under EUUP based on Eq. (6), SKEW is the CBOE SKEW index, OI is the option interest of IYF options, SDVIX is the standard deviation of VIX, and NBER is the 
National Bureau of Economic Research recession indicator.  
 







-0.100 -0.016 -0.076 -0.209 0.040 -0.061 -0.402** -0.154 -0.228 
(-0.947) (-0.137) (-0.730) (-0.979) (0.160) (-0.248) (-2.362) (-1.014) (-1.571)
0.827*** 0.855*** 0.733*** 1.219*** 1.302*** 1.096*** 0.365*** 0.448*** 0.296**
(14.634) (13.616) (13.912) (11.544) (11.659) (9.405) (3.457) (3.695) (2.415)
- 0.016** 0.011* - 0.047** 0.040* - 0.047*** 0.042***
- (2.128) (1.649) - (1.964) (1.661) - (3.589) (3.199)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006*** 0.004 0.005** 0.003** 0.000 0.001 
(0.542) (-0.417) (0.306) (3.618) (1.607) (2.193) (2.360) (0.215) (1.015)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000*
(1.181) (1.312) (1.381) (5.968) (6.167) (6.301) (-2.044) (-1.734) (-1.743)
0.009 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.041***
(1.209) (1.164) (1.149) (0.231) (0.121) (0.054) (3.873) (3.951) (4.039)
- - 0.093*** - - 0.158*** - - 0.117***
- - (3.157) - - (2.843) - - (4.831)
Adj R2 59.98% 60.21% 62.34% 41.76% 42.27% 43.74% 32.37% 34.59% 38.05%












Table S3 - Monthly effect of ambiguity on systemic banking risk under α-MEP and EUUP  
The table summarizes our 2003-2009 monthly regression results based on Eq. (19). This model is compared to the multivariate structure without the AMB term. DR stands for 
systemic banks’ downside risk, EBETA is systemic banks’ market beta risk, and CR is systemic banks’ credit risk. AMBalpha-MEP and AMBalpha-MEPSUM are the elicited ambiguity 
indicators under α-MEP based on Eqs. (16-18). AMBBIIYF is the ambiguity indicator from IYF based on Eq. (6). IV denotes implied volatility. SKEW is the CBOE SKEW index. 
OI denotes open-interest information and SDVIX is the volatility of VIX. 
 
t-statistics in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
1.OTM 2.ITM 3.OTM 4.ITM 5.OTM 6.ITM 7.OTM 8.ITM 9.OTM 10.ITM 11.OTM 12.ITM 13.OTM 14.ITM 15.OTM 16.ITM 17.OTM 18.ITM 19.OTM 20.ITM 21.OTM 22.ITM
0.119 0.209 -0.005 0.227 0.050 0.093 1.100* 1.143* 2.830*** 2.806*** 2.354*** 2.177*** 2.377*** 2.054*** -0.195 0.076 -0.240 0.110 -0.301 -0.140 1.848*** 2.118***
(0.197) (0.338) (-0.009) (0.372) (0.086) (0.153) (1.687) (1.764) (3.676) (3.627) (2.963) (2.788) (3.105) (2.586) (-0.305) (0.110) (-0.390) (0.168) (-0.510) (-0.215) (3.459) (3.848)
1.212*** 1.131*** 1.301*** 1.096*** 1.117*** 1.079*** 0.956*** 0.863*** 1.089*** 0.983*** 1.063*** 0.959*** 1.001*** 0.885*** 0.366*** 0.472*** 0.311** 0.406*** 0.219* 0.375*** -0.169 -0.115 
(9.512) (9.302) (9.891) (9.010) (8.612) (8.814) (6.542) (6.115) (6.697) (6.458) (6.643) (6.547) (6.218) (5.881) (2.707) (3.455) (2.353) (3.096) (1.674) (2.864) (-1.409) (-0.957)
- - 0.151* 0.171* - - - - - - 0.434* 0.707*** - - - - 0.229** 0.324*** - - - -
- - (1.772) (1.695) - - - - - - (1.921) (2.616) - - - - (2.513) (2.985) - - - -
- - - - 0.262** 0.254* - - - - - - 0.438** 0.736*** - - - - 0.403*** 0.478*** - -
- - - - (2.366) (1.886) - - - - - - (2.453) (2.650) - - - - (3.605) (3.311) - -
- - - - - - 0.080*** 0.082*** - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.167*** 0.179***
- - - - - - (3.089) (3.230) - - - - - - - - - - - - (7.851) (8.310)
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.010* -0.010* -0.016** -0.016** -0.015** -0.016** -0.014** -0.014** 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.000 -0.003 -0.017*** -0.020***
(-0.289) (-0.436) (-0.296) (-0.684) (-0.360) (-0.528) (-1.749) (-1.824) (-2.479) (-2.448) (-2.352) (-2.480) (-2.246) (-2.233) (0.030) (-0.438) (-0.167) (-0.893) (-0.061) (-0.617) (-3.726) (-4.172)
0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
(0.264) (0.474) (-0.280) (0.257) (-0.090) (0.203) (-0.579) (0.234) (-0.856) (0.685) (-0.934) (0.678) (-1.019) (0.327) (3.986) (1.247) (3.637) (0.919) (3.721) (0.839) (3.096) (1.059)
-0.000 -0.012 0.035 0.040 0.052 0.033 -0.039 -0.059 -0.107 -0.130 -0.129 -0.158* -0.143 -0.171* 0.168** 0.218*** 0.244*** 0.316*** 0.250*** 0.303*** 0.089 0.116**
(-0.007) (-0.165) (0.475) (0.514) (0.726) (0.444) (-0.573) (-0.846) (-1.185) (-1.440) (-1.453) (-1.809) (-1.623) (-1.942) (2.253) (2.688) (3.125) (3.785) (3.438) (3.784) (1.597) (1.974)
0.193*** 0.198*** 0.170*** 0.188*** 0.138** 0.169** 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.413*** 0.409*** 0.395*** 0.370*** 0.345*** 0.368*** -0.019 0.000 -0.047 -0.020 -0.105 -0.055 0.067 0.081 
(2.969) (2.956) (2.702) (2.820) (2.046) (2.493) (3.731) (3.679) (4.981) (4.865) (4.813) (4.507) (4.060) (4.493) (-0.279) (0.005) (-0.705) (-0.280) (-1.543) (-0.760) (1.292) (1.494)
Adj R2 76.92% 75.42% 78.64% 76.07% 78.36% 76.30% 79.46% 78.38% 73.02% 72.32% 74.03% 74.48% 74.85% 74.54% 45.47% 34.77% 49.37% 41.48% 53.55% 43.00% 70.98% 67.16%
F 50.316 46.421 45.806 40.212 45.655 40.710 48.709 45.713 41.057 39.669 36.163 36.999 37.706 37.113 13.343 8.888 13.029 9.742 15.217 10.304 31.162 26.221
-0.129 0.171 -0.192 -0.140 -0.158 0.052 0.586 1.035 2.623*** 2.977*** 2.373*** 2.271*** 2.221*** 2.097*** -0.362 -0.289 -0.454 -0.711 -0.417 -0.447 1.774*** 1.836***
(-0.222) (0.288) (-0.343) (-0.235) (-0.276) (0.090) (0.892) (1.559) (3.289) (3.789) (3.023) (2.864) (2.790) (2.646) (-0.552) (-0.458) (-0.742) (-1.149) (-0.677) (-0.748) (3.115) (3.385)
1.127*** 1.297*** 0.992*** 1.250*** 1.050*** 1.255*** 0.926*** 1.045*** 0.887*** 1.112*** 0.806*** 1.012*** 0.812*** 1.015*** 0.571*** 0.428*** 0.376*** 0.364*** 0.426*** 0.372*** -0.030 -0.190 
(10.364) (9.831) (8.459) (9.600) (9.153) (9.746) (6.553) (6.499) (5.943) (6.356) (5.378) (5.923) (5.450) (6.054) (4.656) (3.047) (2.930) (2.686) (3.452) (2.782) (-0.242) (-1.444)
- - 0.282** 0.304** - - - - - - 0.282** 0.563*** - - - - 0.409*** 0.413*** - - - -
- - (2.552) (2.194) - - - - - - (2.187) (2.758) - - - - (3.387) (2.864) - - - -
- - - - 0.202* 0.305** - - - - - - 0.418** 0.841*** - - - - 0.379*** 0.406*** - -
- - - - (1.852) (2.399) - - - - - - (2.240) (3.118) - - - - (3.229) (3.072) - -
- - - - - - 0.057** 0.069** - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.169*** 0.170***
- - - - - - (2.152) (2.543) - - - - - - - - - - - - (7.416) (7.654)
0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.010* -0.015** -0.018*** -0.013* -0.015** -0.013* -0.016** 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.076) (-0.471) (0.168) (-0.234) (-0.002) (-0.648) (-0.998) (-1.695) (-2.159) (-2.672) (-1.956) (-2.308) (-1.959) (-2.460) (0.175) (0.175) (0.306) (0.505) (0.048) (-0.022) (-3.469) (-3.621)
0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000* 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000***
(1.225) (-0.857) (1.049) (-1.093) (0.909) (-1.331) (1.220) (-1.359) (1.322) (-1.563) (0.958) (-1.697) (1.010) (-1.774) (1.715) (3.530) (1.543) (3.408) (1.246) (3.079) (2.166) (3.231)
-0.027 -0.006 -0.005 0.013 0.013 0.055 -0.056 -0.037 -0.141 -0.108 -0.173* -0.146 -0.175* -0.151* 0.195*** 0.163** 0.227*** 0.189*** 0.271*** 0.244*** 0.111* 0.087 
(-0.409) (-0.088) (-0.079) (0.187) (0.185) (0.760) (-0.839) (-0.547) (-1.540) (-1.173) (-1.911) (-1.639) (-1.940) (-1.721) (2.594) (2.204) (3.213) (2.658) (3.638) (3.267) (1.921) (1.561)
0.172*** 0.168** 0.090 0.116* 0.132** 0.135** 0.205*** 0.215*** 0.405*** 0.412*** 0.330*** 0.373*** 0.342*** 0.364*** -0.053 -0.057 -0.172** -0.127* -0.128* -0.100 0.045 0.059 
(2.744) (2.561) (1.317) (1.711) (2.024) (2.086) (3.251) (3.269) (4.708) (4.739) (3.650) (4.441) (3.879) (4.367) (-0.748) (-0.813) (-2.300) (-1.791) (-1.818) (-1.487) (0.821) (1.100)
Adj R2 78.92% 77.73% 80.48% 78.90% 79.64% 79.17% 79.98% 79.36% 71.49% 71.87% 72.97% 74.33% 73.06% 75.03% 43.57% 46.84% 51.00% 51.86% 50.35% 52.63% 68.34% 71.02%




























Downside Risk (DR) Systematic Risk (EBETA) Credit Risk (CR)
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Table S4 - Systemic banking risk and economic activity under α-MEP and EUUP 
The table summarizes our lagged univariate regressions on the effect of systemic banking risk (SBR) on economic 
activity over 2003-2009. CUG stands for capacity utilization growth (production). TNPG denotes total non-farm 
payroll growth (employment) and CFNAI is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (economic performance). 
RawSBR are direct and raw measures of systemic risk. SBRalphacall, SBRalphaput and SBRalphaSUM and SBRAMB_BI are 
predicted systemic banking risk measures based on Eq. (19) under α-MEP and EUUP. DR, EBETA and CR are 
as defined before. 
 
























4.90*** 4.14*** 4.39*** 4.67*** 4.29*** 4.62*** 4.51*** 4.46*** 4.61*** 4.82*** 4.53***
(4.88) (3.48) (3.70) (4.08) (3.71) (4.05) (3.88) (3.84) (3.96) (4.51) (4.08)
-18.03*** -17.16*** -17.88*** -18.92*** -17.40*** -17.53*** -17.22*** -17.34*** -17.81*** -18.60*** -17.35***
(-8.11) (-5.07) (-5.01) (-5.53) (-5.19) (-5.30) (-5.13) (-6.56) (-6.75) (-7.23) (-6.32)
Adj R2 43.66% 23.37% 25.12% 29.41% 25.40% 29.21% 27.38% 25.37% 26.47% 29.49% 25.80%
F 57.58 23.26 25.49 31.41 25.85 31.12 28.52 25.81 27.28 31.54 26.39
13.14*** 17.20*** 16.99*** 18.35*** 17.95*** 17.31*** 17.00*** 15.07*** 14.37*** 15.81*** 15.29***
(4.84) (4.51) (4.55) (5.02) (5.04) (4.57) (4.70) (3.98) (3.99) (3.78) (3.84)
-11.75*** -14.72*** -14.53*** -15.73*** -15.32*** -15.01*** -14.78*** -13.24*** -12.64*** -13.77*** -13.35***
(-5.02) (-4.57) (-4.56) (-5.03) (-5.10) (-4.58) (-4.73) (-3.96) (-3.97) (-3.75) (-3.79)
Adj R2 22.83% 27.03% 26.08% 32.85% 30.15% 26.67% 24.93% 22.31% 20.33% 25.41% 23.24%
F 22.60 28.04 26.75 36.71 32.50 27.54 25.24 21.96 19.62 25.87 23.10
1.24 2.46** 2.41** 2.48*** 2.54*** 2.32*** 2.10** 1.59 1.58 1.76 1.70 
(1.28) (2.48) (2.46) (2.73) (2.90) (2.64) (2.34) (1.10) (1.05) (1.39) (1.16)
-19.71*** -34.28*** -32.43*** -32.78*** -34.12*** -27.96*** -26.46*** -21.78*** -21.25*** -22.83*** -22.21***
(-5.75) (-4.20) (-4.40) (-5.25) (-5.15) (-3.96) (-3.78) (-3.84) (-3.33) (-4.45) (-3.84)
Adj R2 25.12% 20.28% 18.29% 23.33% 22.69% 23.33% 20.60% 16.72% 15.30% 18.96% 16.98%
F 25.48 19.57 17.34 23.21 22.42 23.21 19.94 15.66 14.18 18.08 15.93
Dependent 
Variable



















2.19*** 2.55*** 2.57*** 2.55*** 2.55*** 2.53*** 2.54*** 2.63*** 2.65*** 2.60*** 2.65***
(9.10) (12.45) (13.04) (15.93) (13.21) (14.33) (13.14) (14.30) (15.33) (14.69) (14.09)
-5.38*** -6.87*** -6.94*** -6.95*** -6.80*** -6.44*** -6.48*** -6.82*** -6.89*** -6.83*** -6.79***
(-7.51) (-10.57) (-11.02) (-17.26) (-12.16) (-13.94) (-12.44) (-19.37) (-23.22) (-25.82) (-18.33)
Adj R2 77.41% 76.36% 76.92% 80.02% 78.89% 79.55% 78.52% 79.82% 80.27% 80.37% 80.20%
F 251.22 236.83 244.33 293.39 273.80 284.97 267.92 289.66 297.99 299.94 296.61
4.85*** 7.29*** 7.31*** 7.09*** 7.22*** 7.30*** 7.40*** 6.50*** 6.51*** 6.43*** 6.38***
(4.93) (12.31) (12.23) (14.09) (15.11) (10.62) (11.49) (12.99) (13.22) (14.73) (15.17)
-3.67*** -5.52*** -5.52*** -5.40*** -5.47*** -5.60*** -5.68*** -4.97*** -4.96*** -4.89*** -4.84***
(-4.10) (-10.93) (-10.84) (-11.82) (-13.36) (-9.09) (-10.08) (-10.22) (-10.26) (-11.39) (-11.86)
Adj R2 44.94% 76.91% 76.26% 77.60% 77.33% 75.09% 74.83% 64.09% 64.14% 64.89% 62.18%
F 60.59 244.14 235.56 253.88 250.04 221.08 218.05 131.27 131.54 135.90 121.02
1.11*** 1.79*** 1.89*** 1.79*** 1.76*** 1.58*** 1.53*** 1.40*** 1.49*** 1.48*** 1.44***
(3.50) (9.05) (9.21) (9.68) (8.79) (6.75) (6.22) (4.24) (4.50) (4.73) (4.34)
-5.99*** -12.99*** -13.28*** -12.42*** -12.48*** -9.51*** -9.21*** -7.87*** -8.32*** -8.36*** -8.05***
(-8.04) (-6.62) (-7.33) (-11.47) (-8.22) (-5.34) (-5.06) (-6.96) (-6.49) (-7.00) (-6.79)
Adj R2 46.64% 59.65% 63.35% 68.16% 61.84% 54.73% 50.90% 45.03% 48.83% 52.08% 45.90%
F 64.80 108.94 127.17 157.28 119.31 89.27 76.68 60.81 70.66 80.33 62.93
Dependent 
Variable



















0.58*** 0.67*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.71*** 0.73*** 0.71*** 0.71***
(6.90) (5.18) (5.49) (6.61) (5.44) (6.39) (5.69) (6.52) (6.91) (7.65) (6.40)
-2.72*** -3.19*** -3.26*** -3.29*** -3.15*** -3.06*** -3.06*** -3.19*** -3.24*** -3.23*** -3.15***
(-11.92) (-7.22) (-7.44) (-9.80) (-7.67) (-8.70) (-7.78) (-10.44) (-11.47) (-14.02) (-9.69)
Adj R2 81.44% 67.73% 69.73% 73.65% 69.64% 74.05% 71.94% 71.60% 72.89% 73.78% 70.82%
F 321.30 154.19 169.16 205.07 168.44 209.30 188.13 185.04 197.28 206.46 178.16
1.89*** 2.89*** 2.87*** 2.88*** 2.91*** 2.93*** 2.94*** 2.51*** 2.47*** 2.48*** 2.46***
(5.93) (6.88) (6.94) (9.55) (8.54) (8.16) (7.93) (6.77) (7.04) (7.81) (7.13)
-1.83*** -2.58*** -2.56*** -2.59*** -2.60*** -2.65*** -2.65*** -2.31*** -2.27*** -2.28*** -2.26***
(-6.18) (-7.16) (-7.18) (-9.81) (-8.90) (-8.22) (-8.12) (-6.95) (-7.13) (-7.92) (-7.36)
Adj R2 45.79% 69.13% 67.47% 73.55% 71.70% 69.08% 67.15% 56.92% 55.18% 58.07% 55.49%
F 62.66 164.47 152.37 203.95 185.93 164.07 150.23 97.43 90.86 102.11 92.02
0.03 0.35*** 0.38*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.19 
(0.23) (4.43) (4.71) (4.33) (4.67) (3.07) (2.63) (1.07) (1.25) (1.41) (1.22)
-3.02*** -6.33*** -6.33*** -5.93*** -6.13*** -4.75*** -4.59*** -3.88*** -4.00*** -4.06*** -3.99***
(-8.48) (-8.12) (-8.35) (-11.32) (-10.41) (-6.65) (-6.34) (-7.92) (-6.89) (-8.18) (-7.74)
Adj R2 48.79% 58.34% 59.17% 63.88% 61.35% 56.24% 52.08% 45.08% 46.27% 50.53% 46.35%



















































Table S5 - Systemic banking risk and economic activity under CU (GMM estimation) 
The table shows GMM estimation results of economic activity on systemic banking risk using AMB and SKEW as instruments. CUG stands for capacity utilization growth 
(production). TNPG denotes total non-farm payroll growth (employment) and CFNAI is the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (economic performance). DR, EBETA, CR, 
SBRCUcall, SBRCUput and SBRCUSUMDEV are as defined before. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) based on Newey and West (1987). 
 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Dependent 
Variable



































4.29*** 4.38*** 4.11*** 4.20*** 4.32*** 4.38*** 2.18*** 2.25*** 2.43*** 2.38*** 2.19*** 2.33*** 0.64*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.64***
(2.90) (3.08) (2.96) (3.43) (3.33) (3.55) (9.43) (8.50) (7.42) (10.18) (8.57) (9.77) (6.80) (6.03) (4.93) (6.21) (5.98) (6.82)
-16.28*** -16.54*** -15.79*** -16.05*** -16.37*** -16.52*** -5.48*** -5.65*** -6.15*** -6.02*** -5.52*** -5.89*** -2.91*** -2.84*** -2.84*** -2.82*** -2.80*** -2.89***
(-4.82) (-5.00) (-5.03) (-5.90) (-5.76) (-6.13) (-6.83) (-6.64) (-5.58) (-7.31) (-6.69) (-7.41) (-9.69) (-9.14) (-7.57) (-9.94) (-9.05) (-10.15)
13.66*** 13.50*** 13.54*** 14.62*** 14.34*** 15.07*** 5.55*** 5.53*** 6.26*** 6.48*** 5.75*** 6.33*** 2.36*** 2.22*** 2.35*** 2.49*** 2.36*** 2.55***
(2.79) (2.88) (4.09) (3.24) (3.54) (3.13) (4.95) (4.81) (5.22) (5.10) (4.65) (4.66) (4.38) (4.04) (4.60) (4.19) (4.00) (3.89)
-12.07*** -11.95*** -11.98*** -12.83*** -12.61*** -13.18*** -4.23*** -4.22*** -4.79*** -4.96*** -4.39*** -4.84*** -2.19*** -2.08*** -2.19*** -2.29*** -2.19*** -2.34***
(-2.92) (-2.95) (-4.18) (-3.30) (-3.61) (-3.18) (-3.95) (-3.88) (-4.29) (-4.19) (-3.80) (-3.86) (-4.36) (-4.05) (-4.55) (-4.19) (-4.02) (-3.92)
2.66** 2.85** 2.68** 2.74** 2.76** 2.80** 1.57*** 1.66*** 1.83*** 1.79*** 1.62*** 1.73*** 0.34*** 0.34** 0.35** 0.34** 0.32** 0.35**
(2.23) (2.33) (1.97) (2.31) (2.11) (2.33) (6.34) (5.53) (5.98) (5.66) (5.64) (5.49) (2.76) (2.41) (2.51) (2.37) (2.26) (2.39)
-30.17*** -31.45*** -30.27*** -30.68*** -30.86*** -31.15*** -9.69*** -10.31*** -11.49*** -11.24*** -10.08*** -10.84*** -5.29*** -5.30*** -5.37*** -5.33*** -5.21*** -5.39***













Production (CUG) Employment (TNPG) Economic Performance (CFNAI)
D
R
Cst
